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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Direct democracy is typically defined as a system in which citizens are able to participate 
directly in political decision-making without relying on representatives or intermediaries. 
However, like representative democracy, direct democracy is only possible if citizens are 
able to exercise a real influence over the decision-making process. The inclusion of direct 
democracy mechanisms in a country’s constitution and other fundamental laws is not a 
sufficient condition for the existence of direct democracy as a genuine participatory process. 
Direct democracy also requires that the law be applied in practice, ideally in a manner that 
improves democratic governance. The example of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) shows that that there are a number of cases in which the legislation allows for 
direct democracy, but in practice this legislation is applied selectively, if at all. Worse still, 
direct democracy mechanisms can be used to strengthen authoritarian levers of control, as 
evidenced by the way in which some presidents in the successor states of the USSR have 
manipulated referendums to augment their own powers at the expense of those of the 
legislature.  The experience of many CIS countries shows that the development of direct 
democracy cannot be separated from the overall democratization process; settings that lack 
fundamental democratic principles such as a political culture supportive of the rule of law 
are unlikely to provide fertile ground for direct democracy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After this very brief introduction to acquaint readers with a general view of the state of 
direct democracy in the twelve non-EU successor states of the USSR, this paper will give an 
overview of the ‘state of the art’ in terms of mechanisms of direct democracy in each of the 
twelve republics. 
 
The issue of direct democracy cannot, clearly, be separated from that of democratisation 
and democratic transition in general. When comparing mechanisms of direct democracy in 
the twelve republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with similar 
mechanisms in other parts of the world, the first thing we must bear in mind is that most of 
the twelve republics are not democracies. Although most possess a formally democratic 
system in terms of a Constitution that guarantees a multiparty system and universal human 
rights, this facade of democracy often obscures an underlying informal reality in which the 
main determinant of political life is raw power unrestrained by the rule of law. If we consider 
the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties, in which countries are rated 
along a range from 1 (full democracy) to 7 (full authoritarianism) on both measures, we see 
that the twelve republics range from hard authoritarianism (Belarus, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan) to flawed democracy (Ukraine) with a number of semi-democratic or semi-
authoritarian systems in between. Figure 1 lists all twelve according to Freedom House’s 
2008 data and categorizes them as ‘flawed democracies’ (with a combined score for political 
rights and civil liberties between 5 and 6), ‘hybrid regimes’ (with a combined score of 7-9), 
‘soft authoritarian regimes’ (combined score of 10-11) and ‘hard authoritarian regimes’ 
(combined score of 12-14). 
 
Figure 1: Freedom House Democracy Indicators, 20081 
 
Republic Political Rights Civil Liberties Regime Type 
Ukraine 3 2 Flawed Democracy 
Moldova 3 4 Hybrid Regime 
Georgia 4 4 Hybrid Regime 
Armenia 5 4 Hybrid Regime 
Kyrgyzstan 5 4 Hybrid Regime 
Azerbaijan 6 5 Soft Authoritarian 
Kazakhstan 6 5 Soft Authoritarian 
Russian Federation 6 5 Soft Authoritarian 
Tajikistan 6 5 Soft Authoritarian 
Belarus 7 6 Hard Authoritarian 
Turkmenistan 7 7 Hard Authoritarian 
Uzbekistan 7 7 Hard Authoritarian 
                                                          
1 Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2008 at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw08launch/FIW08Tables.pdf. 
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According to the same categorization, adding also the category “full democracy” for a 
composite Freedom House score of 2-4, the twenty-four Latin American countries (including 
also Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago for reasons of geographical 
proximity) are found to consist of ten full democracies, ten flawed democracies, three hybrid 
regimes and one hard authoritarian regime (Cuba). All EU members fall into the “full 
democracy” category. The CIS therefore lags far behind these other two regions in terms of 
democratic development. 
 
In many of the twelve republics, a legal framework is in place that allows for a number of 
mechanisms for direct democracy, including citizens’ assemblies, citizens’ initiatives to enact 
local and national legislation, and local and national referendums that may also arise from 
citizens’ initiatives. However, in reality, these mechanisms are either hardly used at all or 
(worse) suborned by an authoritarian leadership in order to exert control. On occasions, 
citizens’ initiatives have been hijacked by the authorities or by economic agents with close 
links to the authorities (as in the 2000 referendum in Ukraine); on others nominal 
instruments of direct democracy have actually been used for purposes of coercion (as in the 
case of citizens’ assemblies in Uzbekistan). This use of direct democracy mechanisms for 
undemocratic ends relates both to a lack of a tradition of independent citizens’ initiatives 
(previously such initiatives could only be made through the institutions of the Communist 
Party) and to a profound weakness in the rule of law. 
 
In most cases, referendums have been about consolidation of power, rather than public 
consultation. Typically, referendums in former Soviet republics have been used to approve 
proposals to augment the power of the president and the presidential administration at the 
expense of the legislative body. In some cases, the end result has been a presidential 
administration that virtually mirrors the old Communist Party in terms of hierarchical 
control. Most of such referendums occurred in the mid-1990s as a final act in a power 
struggle between the president and parliament, although some also occurred in the new 
millennium. They have often been marred by electoral fraud—especially to artificially inflate 
turnout figures—and very little time has been devoted to public consultation so that voters 
can consider the proposals they are supposed to vote on. Often there is a very short time 
period between the finalization of the referendum questions and the referendum itself. On 
occasions a number of diverse issues have been lumped together into a single proposal, 
preventing voters from expressing a positive attitude to one and a negative attitude to 
another. 
 
The section below looks at each republic in the CIS in terms of (1) legal provisions for direct 
democracy and (2) the practical application of measures of direct democracy. In terms of 
practical application, this paper provides details of all national referendums held in the 
twelve republics. However, the list of local referendums held may not be exhaustive and 
further research is needed to find further evidence of referendums held at village and 
community level. Preliminary research suggests that such instances are rare. 
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2. Country Profiles 
 
Armenia 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives 
 
According to Article 111 of the Constitution, the Constitution of Armenia must be adopted or 
amended by a referendum, and referendums can be initiated either by the president of the 
Republic of Armenia or by the National Assembly (parliament). Similarly, Article 112 states 
that “laws may be submitted to a referendum upon the request of the National Assembly or 
the government” and “[l]aws passed by referendum may only be amended by referendum.” 
Prior to the 2005 amendments (see below), a referendum was only considered to have been 
passed if it received more than fifty per cent of the votes and more than one third of 
registered voters. After the amendments the latter figure was reduced to one quarter. The 
2005 constitutional amendments also contained a clause stating that “community members 
can directly take part in the administration of community affairs by resolving local problems 
through local referendums”, adding that “the law shall define the procedure and terms for 
conducting a local referendum” (Article 107). Similarly the post-2005 version of Article 110 
states that referendums may be used at local level to merge or separate units of local self-
government (communities). A Law On Local Referendum was adopted in 2002, but was 
apparently only enacted in 2006. There is no evidence available that local referendums have 
yet been held. 
 
According to Article 4 of the Law on Referendums (2001), the following issues cannot be 
submitted to referendum: a) the articles of the Constitution dealing with the sovereignty of 
the state and the democratic nature thereof (Articles 1, 2 and 114), b) issues of prolonging 
or reducing the powers of incumbent president and National Assembly as well as incumbent 
state and local self-governing bodies, c) issues related to human and citizens’ rights, 
freedoms and obligations, the elimination or restriction of constitutional guarantees 
providing their implementation, as well as issues directly bestowed to the exclusive 
competence of state and local self-governing bodies.  
 
Referendums 
 
Since 1991, four referendums have been held in Armenia. The first, held on 21 September 
1991, to approve the independence of Armenia as a state, was overwhelmingly approved by 
voters. The second was held on 5 July 1995, simultaneously with parliamentary elections, to 
approve the Constitution of Armenia. The Constitution established a strong presidency and 
gave the president the right to represent the country in international negotiations, to sign 
agreements and treaties, to appoint the chief prosecutor and the prime minister and, 
following receipt of a list of candidates proposed by the prime minister, to appoint the 
Cabinet of Ministers. He was also made commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and was 
given the right to dissolve parliament following consultations with the prime minister.  As 
irregularities were observed in the parliamentary elections, in which one of the main 
political parties, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks), was banned, doubts 
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were cast as to the extent to which the referendum was truly free and fair. According to 
official results, around 70% of voters approved the Constitution on a 56% turnout. 
Following these two ‘key’ referendums, two further referendums were held to amend the 
Constitution. The first of these was held on 25 May 2003 and once again coincided with the 
parliamentary elections. This referendum was supposed to mark the culmination of a 
lengthy process of consultation on the Constitution, which began on 19 May 1998 when the 
newly elected president, Robert Kocharian, issued a decree to create a commission to 
amend the Armenian Constitution, in particular by reducing the sweeping powers of the 
president and augmenting those of parliament. This must be seen in the context of the fact 
that Kocharian had been propelled to the presidency just three months previously with the 
support of the powerful Yerkrapah union of Karabakh war veterans, who had ousted his 
predecessor Levon Ter Petrosian, and had yet to consolidate his own power base. There was 
also suspicion that the 1995 referendum on the Constitution had been manipulated by Ter 
Petrosian’s administration (see above). However, following the assassination in October 
1999 of one of the leaders of Yerkrapah, prime minister Vazgen Sarkisian, the constitutional 
reform programme was put on the back burner as power gradually consolidated around 
Kocharian and his close associates. In 1999 Kocharian replaced the commission's members 
with lawyers who occupied senior government posts. The commission only published its 
findings on 6 February 2001; these provided for a modest reduction in the president’s 
powers. The president would now need the parliament’s consent to appoint a prime 
minister, would no longer be able to approve or veto government decisions, and would be 
allowed to dissolve parliament only in six specific cases. If his candidates for premier were 
twice rejected by the legislature, then he would have to accept for that post the person 
nominated by the parliament speaker. The president would also forfeit the right to dismiss 
Constitutional Court judges.  The amendments were generally accepted by the Council of 
Europe. However, in March 2003, President Kocharian abolished two of the key proposed 
amendments that, if approved, would have transferred some of his sweeping powers to 
parliament. In particular, the president retained the power to nominate and dismiss the 
prime minister and the cabinet. The opposition dismissed the remaining constitutional 
amendments as cosmetic and therefore neither government nor opposition was particularly 
concerned about getting them passed. Indeed, in Resolution 1458, the Council of Europe 
notes that the authorities “had not committed themselves to a campaign in support of the 
reform.”2 In the referendum held on 25 May 2003 on this modest package of reforms, 50.3% 
of valid votes were cast in favour of the amendments on a turnout of 52%.3 However, the 
referendum was rejected as a third of registered voters did not vote in favour of the 
amendment as required by law. 
 
Under pressure from the Council of Europe (see, for example, PACE Resolution 13614, 27 
January 2004), the authorities later agreed to reopen discussions on constitutional reform. 
In September 2004, three separate draft packages of proposed amendments were 
submitted to the Armenian parliament, prepared respectively by the ruling three-party 
coalition, the pro-government United Labor Party, and by the leader of the National 
                                                          
2 http://www.coe.am/en/docs/pace/resolution_1458.pdf. 
3 Armenian Central Election Commission at www.elections.am. 
4 http://www.coe.am/en/docs/pace/resolution_1361.pdf. 
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Democratic Party, Arshak Sadoyan. These three drafts were then submitted for evaluation 
by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, which assessed the first two as an 
improvement on the present constitution, but rejected Sadoyan's draft as failing to address 
certain crucial issues related to human rights and the judiciary. The commission further 
suggested a number of changes to the government draft, specifically with regard to 
expanding the powers of the legislature, limiting the president’s authority to appoint and 
dismiss judges, and introducing elections for the post of Yerevan mayor. In early May, the 
Armenian parliament approved a somewhat revised version of the draft prepared by the 
ruling coalition. Sadoyan denounced the draft and called on all political forces to reject it. 
For its part, in late May the Council of Europe's Venice Commission deplored the authorities’ 
failure to take into account its recommendations regarding the balance of powers between 
the president and the Parliament, the independence of the judiciary and the election of the 
mayor of Yerevan.5 In late June, Armenia submitted to the Venice Commission an amended 
draft that addressed these concerns. The Commission approved the revised draft on 21 July, 
but opposition parties nonetheless continued to reject the proposed amendments. The final 
draft made changes to 109 articles of the country's 117-article Constitution and, most 
importantly, envisaged a modest reduction in the powers of the president. Specifically, it 
obliged the president to appoint a prime minister with the approval of parliament, taking 
into account the distribution of seats between parliamentary factions, whereas previously 
his choice of prime minister depended entirely on his own discretion. It also stipulated that 
the prime minister, rather than the president, would chair meetings of the government. It 
sought to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and replaced the president as 
Chairman of the Justice Council with the Chairman of the Court of Cassation. Finally, it 
granted the city of Yerevan the status of a community, meaning that the city’s mayor would 
henceforth be elected either directly by the population or indirectly by the elected city 
council, rather than appointed by the president. These changes were put to a referendum on 
27 November 2005. Despite the fact that the effect of the changes would be to reduce the 
powers of the president somewhat, the opposition boycotted the referendum on the 
grounds that it was fundamentally aimed at providing legitimacy to the government, which 
they saw as illegitimate after the flawed presidential and parliamentary elections of 2003. 
Official results of the referendum gave a “yes” vote of 95% on a turnout of 65%, making the 
referendum valid, but domestic and international observers expressed severe doubts as to 
the level of the turnout and denounced numerous violations. The opposition claimed that 
the turnout was, in reality, less than 20%.6 The constitutional amendments were presented 
to voters as a single package making it impossible for them to vote on them individually. 
 
Azerbaijan 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives 
 
According to Article 2 of the Constitution, the people of Azerbaijan can settle any issue 
connected with their rights and interests by means of a referendum, and a referendum must 
be held to adopt and amend the Constitution and to approve changes to Azerbaijan’s state 
                                                          
5 See http://www.coe.am/en/docs/pace/resolution_1458.pdf. 
6 http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/armenia_3075.jsp. 
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border. According to the constitutional amendments of 2002, the following issues cannot be 
addressed by referendum: 1) Taxes and the state budget, 2) amnesty and pardoning, 3) 
election, appointment and approval of officials whose election, appointment and approval 
are under the responsibilities of the legislative and/or executive authorities. According to 
Article 41 of the 1998 Law on Referendum, a referendum is passed if more than half of all 
registered voters take part in the referendum and more than half of those voting approve 
the measure. 
 
According to Azerbaijan’s Law on Local Referendums, municipal governments in Azerbaijan 
may hold a referendum on any issue within their competence at their own initiative or at the 
request of at least ten percent of eligible voters in that territory. These referendums must be 
financed from local budgets.7 There is no documentation of any local referendums having 
been held.  
 
The law also permits citizens to take part in local decision-making through public assemblies. 
The Law on the Status of Municipalities (1999) allows public assemblies to adopt resolutions 
in municipalities with less than 500 inhabitants. In order for these assemblies to function, at 
least 25% of all adult residents must take part. In these assemblies, residents can give an 
opinion on local issues, initiate proposals and adopt, amend or dissolve the municipal 
charter.  Similarly, according to the law, 10% of the population of a given municipality can 
call a session of the local council.8 There is no documentation of these mechanisms having 
been used. 
 
Referendums 
 
Since 1991, five referendums have been held in Azerbaijan. The first, proclaiming Azerbaijan 
a sovereign republic, was held on 17 March 1991—simultaneously with the referendum on 
the preservation of the USSR—and was overwhelmingly approved by voters. The second, 
held on 29 December 1991, to approve the independence of Azerbaijan as an independent 
state, was also overwhelmingly approved with more than 99% of voters supporting 
independence. 
 
The third referendum was a referendum of confidence on former president Abulfaz Elchibey 
held on 29 August 1993. This referendum was held two months after Elchibey’s overthrow 
and his replacement as acting head of state by former Communist party first secretary of the 
Azerbaijan SSR, Heidar Aliev. It was therefore held to secure Aliev’s grip on power and, 
according to official results, a questionable 97% expressed no confidence in the former 
president. 
  
The referendum on the new Constitution of Azerbaijan took place on 12 November 1995. 
The draft Constitution proposed a presidential republic with far-reaching powers for the 
president, including the right to appoint and dismiss members of the Cabinet of Ministers 
                                                          
7 Meriban Mamedova, Hafiz Bashir Ogli Hasanov, Abil Nazir Ogli Bairamov and Mirali Asad Huseinov, 
“Local Government in Azerbaijan” at http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2001/84/Ch7-Azerbaijan.pdf. 
8 Ibid.. 
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and to issue decrees and orders. According to the draft, if parliament were to reject his 
choice of prime minister three times, the president would have the right to override the will 
of parliament and appoint the prime minister without the need for further consultation. 
According to the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Azerbaijan, 86% of voters participated 
in the referendum, with 91.9% of those voting approving the new Constitution.9  
 
The fifth and final national referendum was held on 24 August 2002 and was aimed 
principally at securing a smooth handover of power from the ailing president Haidar Aliev to 
his son Ilham. Its secondary aim was to make the Constitution of Azerbaijan compatible with 
the country’s membership of the Council of Europe (which it joined in 2001) and with its 
membership of the European Convention on Human Rights. It appeared that the rather 
minor constitutional changes ostensibly aimed at bringing the country into line with its 
international commitments were used as a smokescreen to justify the other constitutional 
changes to the international audience. Eight separate packages of constitutional 
amendments were voted upon: 1) A package to make the Constitution of Azerbaijan 
compatible with the country’s membership of the Council of Europe, which included 
empowering the parliament to elect an ombudsman and granting individuals access to the 
Constitutional Court, 2) a package harmonizing the Constitution with its membership of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, most notably by offering a civilian alternative to 
military service and by striking off an article allowing armed force to be used in executing 
orders given by ‘authorized persons during martial law or state of emergency’, 3) another 
package, of which the most noteworthy was an amendment submitting the Constitution of 
the autonomous republic of Nakhichevan for approval by parliament, 4) A package of judicial 
reforms, most importantly giving the right of legislative initiative to the Prosecutor-General's 
Office, 5) changes to the organization of parliament and government, of which the most 
important was to vest the prime minister, rather than the chairman of parliament, with the 
power of acting president in the event of the current president’s resignation (clearly 
favouring Ilham Aliev, who was appointed prime minister the following year), 6) an 
amendment allowing the president to be elected with half the votes cast in the first round, 
rather than two-thirds as previously stated, 7) an amendment excluding from the list of 
issues that can be the subject of a nationwide referendum those that lie within the 
competence of the executive, such as taxes, the state budget, amnesties, elections, and 
appointments to executive posts, and 8) an amendment changing the existing mixed 
majoritarian-proportional system for parliamentary elections into a purely majoritarian 
system. 
 
The referendum was marred by credible allegations of fraud. According to official results, 
between 95.18% and 96.37% of voters voted “yes” for each of the eight packages on a 
turnout of 83.86%. The closeness of the figures for the “yes” vote as well as their high values 
suggests that either the voters did not fully understand what the constitutional packages 
involved or that the vote was artificially inflated, or both. Opposition parties claimed that no 
more than 15-20% of voters went to the polls and the local observer organization “For the 
                                                          
9 See the website of the Central Election Commission of Azerbaijan at 
http://www.cec.gov.az/en/common/election-referendum/1995.htm. 
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sake of Civil Society” recorded a turnout of just 27.8% in the seven districts it observed.10 
U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher suggested that there had been 
“widespread irregularities, such as voter-list fraud, multiple voting, and ballot-box 
stuffing”11, while the OSCE stated that “the process fell short of providing a credible and 
reliable means of eliciting the views of the population.”12 
 
On 10 December 1991, a referendum was held in the war-torn enclave of Nagorno-
Karabakh, which was then in the hands of separatist Armenian forces. The referendum 
proposed independence from Azerbaijan and was approved by 99.9% of voters on an 82% 
turnout.13 Fifteen years later, on 10 December 2006, a second referendum was held in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, which since the end of the 1988-94 war had been under the full control 
of Armenia. The referendum proposal was to approve a draft Constitution defining Nagorno-
Karabakh as a sovereign state. As virtually the entire population of the enclave is ethnic 
Armenian and those of other nationalities expelled from the autonomous region during the 
war were denied the vote, the outcome was not in doubt. The overwhelming majority of the 
existing population of the enclave favour independence or incorporation into Armenia. 
According to official results, 98.6% of voters approved the Constitution on an estimated 
turnout of 84%.14 The outcome of the referendum was not recognized by the international 
community, which still considers Nagorno-Karabakh to be a part of Azerbaijan. The purpose 
of the referendum was an attempt by the Armenian authorities and the de facto authorities 
in Nagorno-Karakakh to push the international community towards recognizing the de facto 
status of the enclave. 
 
Belarus 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives  
 
According to the Constitution of Belarus, “the direct participation of citizens in the 
administration of the affairs of society and the State shall be safeguarded by the holding of 
referendums, the discussion of draft laws and issues of national and local significance, and 
by other means specified in law. In instances determined by the law the citizens of the 
Republic of Belarus shall take part in the discussion of issues of state and public life at 
republican and local meetings” (Article 37). Moreover, “[n]ational and local referendums 
may be held to resolve the most important issues of the State and society” (Article 73); 
“[n]ational referendums shall be called on the initiative of the President of the Republic of 
Belarus, as well as on the initiative of the Council of the Republic or House of 
Representatives, which is taken at their separate sittings by a majority of the full number of 
deputies of each house, or on the initiative of no fewer than 450,000 citizens eligible to vote, 
                                                          
10 For the Sake of Civil Society Report on the Monitoring of the August 24th 2002 Referendum at 
http://www.fscs-az.com/index.php?lngs=eng&cats=4&ids=3. 
11 Anar Kerimov, “Azerbaijani Referendum: Soviet Legacy Continues”, Central Asia Caucasus Institute 
Analyst, 28 August 2002 at http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/392. 
12 Azernews, Issue No. 35 (269), September 4 - 10, 2002, at 
http://www.bakupages.com/pubs/azernews/9094_en.php. 
13 Nagorno-Karabakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.nkr.am/rus/facts/referendum.html. 
14 RFE/RL Newsline, 11 December 2006, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2006/12/111206.asp. 
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including no fewer than 30,000 citizens from each of the regions (oblasts) and city of Minsk” 
(Article 74); “[l]ocal referendums shall be called by the relevant local representative bodies 
on their initiative or on the recommendation of no less than ten percent of the citizens who 
are eligible to vote and resident in the area concerned” (Article 75); “[t]he decisions adopted 
by referendum may be reversed or amended only by means of another referendum, unless 
otherwise specified by the referendum” (Article 77). Moreover, according to Article 140 of 
the Constitution, Sections 1 (on the principles of the constitutional system), 2 (on the 
individual, society and the state), 4 (on the president, parliament, government, and courts), 
and 8 (applying and amending the Constitution) of the Constitution may be reconsidered 
only by means of a referendum. This implies that Sections 3 (on the electoral system and 
referendums), 5 (on local government and self-government), 6 (on the prosecutor's office 
and the state supervisory committee), 7 (on the financial and credit system of the Republic 
of Belarus) and 9 (final and transitional clauses) can be amended with the support of a two-
thirds majority in both chambers of parliament and without the need for a referendum. In 
terms of citizens’ initiatives, the right to legislative initiative belongs not only to the 
president, members of the upper and lower chambers of parliament and the government, 
but also to an initiative group of at least 50,000 citizens who are eligible to vote (Article 99). 
According to Article 97, however, the lower chamber of parliament (House of 
Representatives) considers draft laws put forward by the President or submitted by no less 
than 150,000 citizens of the Republic of Belarus, who are eligible to vote. Similarly, “the 
issue of amending and supplementing the Constitution shall be considered by the chambers 
of the Parliament on the initiative of the President or of no fewer than 150,000 citizens of 
the Republic of Belarus who are eligible to vote” (Article 138).  
 
There is ample legislative scope for direct democracy in Belarus; the only problem is that the 
relevant legislation is not applied in practice. Belarus has (on paper at least) a myriad of 
forms of community governance, such as neighbourhood and village committees and 
communities of elders. Such forms of community governance are regulated by the Law “On 
Local Government and Self-governance” (originally introduced as the Law on Self-
government and Local Economy in 1991 and extensively amended).  Moreover, the Law on 
National and Local Assemblies, adopted in July 2000, establishes the principle of citizen’s 
assemblies, which may be convened at the initiative of local councils, local executive 
committees, local administrations, community organizations and citizens’ initiative groups. 
Such an assembly must be attended by at least 25% of all (adult) local inhabitants or at least 
two-thirds of their authorized representatives. According to the Law, participants of citizens’ 
assemblies may discuss issues of national and local importance, make recommendations, 
establish and dissolve community organizations of self-government, participate in the 
preliminary discussion and drafting of local government decisions on vital issues and assess 
the activities of local self-government. Nevertheless, there is no documentation of any 
effective citizens’ assemblies being established in Belarus. Similarly, the Law “On Local 
Government” also envisages legislative initiatives by citizens on issues of local importance. 
However, the law does not stipulate procedures for realizing these initiatives, leaving it to 
local councils to establish procedures of their own. Local councils have proved unwilling or 
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unable to do so and by 2001, this instrument of direct democracy had yet to be put into 
practice.15 
 
Despite the constitutional provisions for the holding of local referendums, by 2001 not a 
single local referendum had been held.16 The same applies to the provision to recall deputies 
at national and local level if they fail to execute their duties or commit violations. According 
to Articles 129 and 130 of the Electoral Code (2000, amended 2006), voters of a 
constituency from which a deputy of the Chamber of Representatives (lower house) or a 
local council deputy is elected may take the initiative to vote on the recall of that deputy if 
he or she “has not justified confidence of voters, expressed in non-fulfilment of the Deputy’s 
duties envisaged by the law, infringement of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, 
laws of the  Republic of Belarus, acts of the President of the Republic of Belarus.” However, 
by 2001 no council members (and no parliamentarian) had been dismissed in this way.17 
The only channel of direct democracy that does appear to function to some degree is that of 
citizens’ appeals. The Law on Law “On Citizens’ Appeals” (1996) grants citizens the right to 
submit appeals to various government bodies on a variety of issues affecting everyday life. 
These appeals are confined to issues such as housing, parks and shopping facilities and do 
not touch upon more sensitive political matters. 
 
Referendums 
 
In Belarus, neither the issue of independence, nor the Constitution, were put to a 
referendum. The Constitution was signed by prime minister Myechyslaw Hryb and approved 
by the Supreme Soviet (parliament) in March 1994. This Constitution provided a presidential 
system of administration with the prime minister and his government appointed and 
dismissed by the president with the consent of a unicameral parliament (the Supreme 
Soviet). 
 
Three referendums have been held in Belarus since the country’s independence—on 14 May 
1995, on 24 November 1996 and on 17 October 2004. The 1995 referendum put the 
following four propositions to voters, all of which were approved by the newly-elected 
president, Alyaksandar Lukashenka (elected in July 1994). The fourth proposition was purely 
consultative and, if approved, would not have force of law: 
 
1) To give the Russian language equal status with Belarussian. 
2) To establish a new state flag and emblem (in fact, representing a return to the old 
Soviet-era symbols). 
3) To pursue economic integration with the Russian Federation. 
4) To change the Constitution to allow the pre-term dissolution of parliament in the 
event of systematic or blatant violation of the Constitution. 
 
                                                          
15 Miroslav Kobasa, Alexander Karamyshev and Valentin Dritz, “Local Government in Belarus” in Igor 
Munteanu and Viktor Popa, Developing New Rules in the Old Environment (LGI Books: 2001) at 
http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2001/84/Ch2-Belorussia.pdf 
16 Ibid.. 
17 Ibid.. 
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All four propositions were passed with a handsome margin of at least 75%. 
The 1996 referendum put the following seven propositions to Belarussian voters. The first 
four propositions (1-4) were posed by the President, who campaigned for a “yes” vote for 
the first two and a no vote for the second two. The last three propositions (5-7) were posed 
by the Supreme Council (parliament), which campaigned for “yes” votes in all three 
instances: 
 
1) To move Independence Day to 3 July, which was the day Belarus was liberated from 
the Nazis. 
2) To approve the 1994 Constitution subject to amendments and additions (in the form 
of a new edition of the document) proposed by the president. 
3) To support the free and unrestricted purchase and sale of land. 
4) To support the abolition of the death penalty. 
5) To approve the 1994 Constitution subject to amendments and additions proposed 
by the Agrarian and Communist factions of the Supreme Soviet. 
6) To make the heads of the local executive organs directly elected by the inhabitants 
of the relevant administrative-territorial units. 
7) To ensure that the financing of all branches of power is open and derives exclusively 
from the state budget. 
 
Here a word of explanation is required about propositions (2) and (5), which involved major 
constitutional changes. The amendments and additions proposed by the president involved 
a significant shift in the balance of power from the Supreme Soviet to the president. The 
260-member Supreme Soviet was to be replaced by a two-chamber parliament, consisting of 
a 110-member House of Representatives (lower chamber), directly elected by secret ballot, 
and a Council of the Republic, made up of eight representatives elected from the councils of 
each region (oblast) of the country and from the capital city (Minsk) as well as eight 
members appointed directly by the President. In addition, many of the powers previously 
invested in the Supreme Soviet were to be transferred to the President. These included the 
right to appoint the Supreme Court, the Supreme Economic Court, the Chairman and the 
members of the board of the National Bank, the Prosecutor General, the Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court and the Chairman of the Central Commission for Elections and 
Referendums. Whereas previously the Supreme Council appointed all members of both the 
Constitutional Court and the Central Commission for Elections and Referendums, 
Lukashenka’s proposals envisaged that six members of both bodies (in addition to the 
chairmen) be appointed by the President and six by the Council of the Republic. The new 
presidential powers would also include the right to call national referendums as well as 
elections to parliament and to local councils. According to the amendments proposed by the 
president, if parliament twice rejected his choice of prime minister the president would have 
the right to dissolve parliament and impose an acting prime minister as he saw fit. Finally a 
transitional clause was added allowing the president to serve a full five-year term from the 
date the new constitutional amendments were passed, effectively extending his first term of 
office from five to seven years. The constitutional amendments proposed by the Agrarian 
and Communist factions of the Supreme Soviet (5), on the other hand, proposed the 
introduction of a purely parliamentary form of government. 
 
C2D Working Paper Series 28/2008 
 
12 
The results of the referendum fully reflected the wishes of President Lukashenka, as 
proposals (1) and (2) were passed with over 80% of the vote, while all other proposals were 
rejected by a margin of at least 60%. The results of the referendum were made binding 
despite a last minute compromise brokered by Moscow between Lukashenka and 
parliamentary speaker Syamyon Sharetsky on 22 November, whereby the results of the 
referendum would be non-binding and consultations would continue. However, the 
following day, the compromise fell through and Lukashenka insisted that the results of the 
referendum would be binding. 
 
The 1996 referendum was condemned both by critics of Lukashenka and by independent 
observers as unfair. Viktar Ganchar, the former head of the Central Commission for Elections 
and Referendums, who had been dismissed by Lukashenka in an apparent violation of the 
existing Constitution, declared the results to be forged18 and a group of parliamentarians 
opposed to Lukashenka cited four procedural violations: the inability to establish how many 
ballot papers were issued, because the president's administration had printed them; early 
voting, which began before the publication of the final drafts of the constitution; funding for 
the referendum from unknown sources rather than the Central Electoral Commission; and 
state control over the media, favouring Lukashenka’s campaign.19 
 
The referendum of 17 October 2004 coincided with parliamentary elections and contained 
just one proposal; to remove the clause restricting presidential office to two five-year terms, 
thereby allowing Lukashenka to be president for an indefinite number of terms. This 
involved amending Article 81 of the Constitution, which stated that the President can stand 
for no more than two terms of office. According to official results, the proposal was 
approved by 88.91% of those casting a valid vote. However, there were widespread reports 
of violations; the local NGO “Partnership”, which fielded 3,500 observers for the 
parliamentary elections and the referendum, registered more than 1,000 violations of the 
election law by members of election commissions. Although they did not monitor the 
referendum, the OSCE reported that the parliamentary elections fell short of Belarus’s OSCE 
commitments.20 
 
Georgia 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives 
  
Article 5 of the Constitution of Georgia states that “[t]he people shall exercise their authority 
through referendum, other forms of direct democracy and their representatives. According 
to Article 74: 
 
1. At the request of the parliament of Georgia, of not less than two hundred thousand 
electors or on his/her own initiative, the president of Georgia shall schedule a 
                                                          
18 RFE/RL Newsline, 26 November 1996, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1996/11/261196.asp. 
19 RFE/RL Newsline, 27 November 1996, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1996/11/271196.asp. 
20 RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report, 20 October 2004, Volume 6, Number  3, at 
http://www.rferl.org/reports/pbureport/2004/10/38-201004.asp. 
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referendum concerning the issues determined by the Constitution and the organic 
law within thirty days after receiving such a request.  
2. The referendum shall not be held with the view of adopting or repealing laws in 
terms of amnesty or pardon, ratification or denunciation of international treaties 
and agreements, as well as on issues restricting the basic constitutional rights and 
freedoms of individuals. 
 
In Georgia a referendum is not required in order to amend the Constitution. According to 
Article 68 of the Constitution, the Constitution can be amended with the consent of two-
thirds of members of parliament. In this way, the Constitution was amended in July 1999 (to 
raise the threshold for parliamentary elections from 5% of the proportional vote to 7%), 
April 2000 (enshrining the status of Adjara as an “autonomous republic”), in March 2001 
(giving international treaties precedence over domestic normative acts and determining that 
relations between Church and State be regulated by a Constitutional Agreement), in October 
2002 (granting the Abkhazian language official status within the territory of Abkhazia), in 
February 2004 (to create a Cabinet of Ministers led by a prime minister, to grant the 
president the right to dissolve parliament and other constitutional changes), in December 
2006 (to change the dates of the parliamentary and presidential elections so that they 
coincide in the autumn of 2008, to remove the President’s right to Chair the Justice Council, 
to enshrine the prohibition of the death penalty in the Constitution and other constitutional 
changes), in February 2008 (to move the date of parliamentary elections back to May 2008), 
and in March 2008 (to reduce the number of MPs elected on the proportional ballot to 75 
and to reduce the threshold back down to 5%).  
 
According to the Organic Law on Referendum (May 1996), an initiative group of citizens can 
be established (for example under the initiative of an NGO or NGOs), which can apply to the 
Central Commission on Referendums (or the Central Election Commission) posing a question 
that can be put to the public in a referendum. If the Commission deems that the petition is 
in accordance with the law, it will issue the initiative group with a certificate of registration 
within one month of receiving the petition (Article 10). The initiative group then has three 
months to collect the required 200,000 signatures (Article 12). If this process is successful, 
the Commission then presents the demand for a referendum to the president, who must fix 
the date of the referendum within 30 days unless he has well-grounded reasons to deem the 
request in contradiction with the Constitution or organic law (Article 13). On one occasion, 
such a petition was successful; in 2003 a coalition of NGOs including the Centre for the 
Protection of Constitutional Rights, Union 21st Century, Former Political Prisoners for 
Human Rights and Women's Club PEONI collected 218,000 signatures for a referendum to 
reduce the number of members of parliament from 235 to 150.21 The referendum was held 
simultaneously with the parliamentary elections of 2 November 2003 and was passed (see 
below). Another attempt by an initiative group was less successful. In July 2005, the Central 
Election Commission (CEC) rejected an request sponsored by the opposition Conservative 
and Republican parties and the NGO Forum for Welfare and Democracy to begin collecting 
signatures for a referendum proposing the direct election of Georgia’s mayors. According to 
                                                          
21 Civil Georgia Online Magazine (9 September 2003) at 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article_ngo.php?id=7329. 
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the CEC, the decision was taken because the referendum question did not meet Article 10 of 
the Organic Law on Referendum, which states that the name, surname and residence of 
each of the members of the sponsoring group be specified and that the question be 
formulated clearly and concretely. However, the sponsors of the request dismissed the CEC’s 
legal arguments as unconstitutional.22 
 
There appears to be no specific legislation governing local referendums. Article 1 of the 
Organic Law on Referendum states that a referendum is a “nationwide interrogation through 
voting on the purposes to final decision of the questions of state importance” (italics mine). 
 
Referendums 
 
After the key referendum on independence was held on 31 March 1991 and overwhelmingly 
approved by the Georgian population living outside the Autonomous Region of South 
Ossetia and the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, no further nationwide referendums were 
held in the next twelve years. Subsequently, two further referendums were held: the first on 
2 November 2003 on reducing the number of members of parliament from 235 to 150 (see 
above) and the second on 5 January 2008, which contained two proposals: 1) To call 
parliamentary elections in the spring of 2008, rather than the autumn and 2) To support 
Georgia’s accession to NATO. 
 
As mentioned above, the first of these two referendums was a civil society initiative. 
Nevertheless, the holding of this referendum was not free of controversy, especially since it 
coincided with parliamentary elections in which 235 parliamentary seats were up for grabs. 
Legal expert David Usupashvili argued that if the referendum were passed, 85 of the new 
parliamentarians would lack legitimacy, casting a cloud over the legitimacy of the entire 
parliament—a situation that could clearly be exploited by certain power brokers. Although 
President Eduard Shevardnadze promised that the new arrangement would not be put in 
place until the subsequent parliamentary elections (scheduled for 2007), he refused to 
countenance a clause in the referendum clarifying this.23 Similarly, the election monitoring 
organization the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) argued that 
holding a referendum simultaneously with the parliamentary elections would complicate the 
counting process.24 Indeed a chaotic counting process proved a major aspect of the flawed 
parliamentary elections that led to massive street protests and the resignation of 
Shevardnadze in what became known as the ‘Rose Revolution’. Official figures showed that 
an overwhelming majority of voters supported the proposal and despite widespread 
electoral fraud it is likely that a majority voted in favour. The change was to be implemented 
in time for the 2008 parliamentary elections. 
 
                                                          
22 Vladic Ravich, “Georgian Opposition Cries Foul over By-Elections, Eurasianet (8 August 2005), at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav080805.shtml. 
23 Civil Georgia Online Magazine (15 September 2003) at 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=4940. 
24 Civil Georgia Online Magazine (12 September 2003) at 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=4924. 
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The second referendum was also conducted against the backdrop of a complicated political 
situation. The referendum was initiated by President Mikheil Saakashvili on 8 November 
2007 after he had declared a state of emergency following large opposition-led 
demonstrations in the streets of Tbilisi. In December 2006, the Georgian parliament had 
amended the Constitution so that parliamentary and presidential elections would be held at 
the same time in the autumn of 2008, instead of a nearly a year apart as originally envisaged 
(parliamentary elections had been due in March 2008 and presidential elections in January 
2009). While the authorities argued that this was to avoid holding Georgian parliamentary 
elections simultaneously with the Russian presidential elections, which may provide a 
pretext for the Russian authorities to destabilize Georgia, the opposition countered that the 
true motive was to use the president’s authority and charisma to ensure a parliamentary 
majority for the ruling United National Movement. During the demonstrations, one of the 
key demands of the opposition was to reschedule the parliamentary elections for the Spring 
as originally planned. To defuse the tension, Saakashvili announced pre-term presidential 
elections for January 2008 as a vote of confidence in his presidency and to hold a 
referendum simultaneously with these elections in which the opposition’s demand to hold 
early presidential elections was included. A second question was added to the referendum 
on whether voters supported Georgia’s integration into NATO, a key policy priority of 
Saakashvili’s administration. 
 
The precise wording of the two referendum questions were as follows: 
 
1.     Do you support Georgia’s integration into NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization)? 
2.     Do you agree that the next parliamentary elections be held in the spring of 2008? 
 
The first question was approved with 77% of valid votes, while the second question was 
approved with nearly 80% of valid votes. Turnout was 56.2%.  
 
At first glance, therefore, while the NATO vote appeared to legitimize the position of the 
Georgian authorities, the vote on the date of the parliamentary elections appeared to 
vindicate the opposition’s position. However, the main aim of the authorities was to ensure 
that the presidential elections were held before the parliamentary elections; otherwise an 
unfavourable result in the parliamentary elections may have jeopardized Saakashvili’s 
chances in the presidential elections. Given that the presidential elections were moved back 
to January, the necessity of holding parliamentary elections in spring rather than in autumn 
was, at worst, a minor inconvenience for the authorities. 
 
Although the opposition claimed electoral fraud in the presidential elections, international 
monitors held the view that any violations that did occur did not alter the final result (in the 
presidential elections Saakashvili was declared the winner with 53.45% of the vote avoiding 
the need for a second round runoff). The results of the referendum also probably more or 
less reflected the will of the voters. 
 
In addition to the nationwide referendums described above the breakaway territories of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have also held referendums within the unrecognized territories 
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themselves. These referendums were declared illegal by international organizations such as 
the OSCE and the Council of Europe, who do not recognize the independence of these 
territories and who did not send monitors. On 3 October 1999, Abkhazia held a referendum 
simultaneously with presidential elections to adopt a Constitution that had already been 
passed by the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia in 1994 and that envisaged full independence for 
the republic. According to the Abkhaz authorities, 87% of voters participated in the 
referendum and 97% of those voted in favour of the proposal. However, former residents of 
Abkhazia living as displaced people in the rest of Georgia since the war over Abkhazia in 
1992-93 were unable to vote. On 12 November 2006, a referendum was also held by the de 
facto authorities in South Ossetia simultaneously with presidential elections (in which only 
de facto leader Eduard Kokoity was the only candidate) with the question “Do you agree 
that the Republic of South Ossetia preserve its current status of an independent state and be 
recognised by the international community?” The motion on independence was approved 
with 99.88%, according to the figures provided by the de facto authorities.25 At the same 
time, an alternative election and referendum were held in those parts of South Ossetia still 
under Georgian administration, prepared by the Tbilisi-backed “Salvation Union of Ossetia” 
that had been established a few weeks earlier. The alternative referendum proposed the 
start of negotiations with Georgia on a federal arrangement for South Ossetia. According to 
the “Salvation Union of South Ossetia” which organized the polls, 94% of voters supported 
the proposal.26 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives 
  
According to Article 91 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan, amendments and additions to the 
Constitution can be introduced by referendum either on the initiative of the president or on 
the recommendation of parliament or the government. However, constitutional changes do 
not have to be put to a referendum if they have been submitted by the president and 
approved by a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament (Article 62). If the initiative 
on constitutional amendments comes from the parliament, the president can veto the 
amendments. In such circumstances, the parliament can override the president’s veto only 
by a four-fifths majority. Under such circumstances, the president can either pass the 
amendments or submit them to a nationwide referendum (Article 91). There is no provision 
for local referendums in Kazakh constitutional law. 
 
According to the Constitutional Law on Referendums (1995, amended 1999), initiative 
groups of citizens can initiate referendums. However, in practice this is hard to do, at least 
without the blessing of the authorities. Thus, on 4 February 2002, an initiative group of 120 
people submitted the relevant documents to the Central Election Commission (CEC) on 4 
February to be registered in order to gather people's signatures in support of holding a 
                                                          
25 International Crisis Group, “Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly” (Europe Report 
No. 183, 7 June 2007) at http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02361.pdf. 
26 Ibid... 
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referendum to make the post of akim (local administrator) an elective post at all levels. The 
CEC disqualified the petition on spurious technicalities. 
  
Article 13 of the Law on Local Public Administration authorizes standing commissions at the 
level of the masilkhat (district, provincial and city councils) to hold public hearings in order 
to discuss certain key issues that are of interest to the public. Following this model, and with 
assistance from USAID/ICMA, public hearings were held in Pavlodar oblast (May 1999) to 
discuss the local budget and in Atyrau and Uralsk to discuss changes to tariffs for communal 
services.27 However, in these cases, the decision to hold public hearings rests with the 
council, not the citizens. 
 
Referendums 
 
Only two referendums have been held in Kazakhstan’s post-independence history. Both 
were held in 1995 and both were exploited by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in a 
Machiavellian bid to amass power. Kazakhstan’s first constitution, which was passed by the 
Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of Kazakhstan on 28 January 1993, established Kazakhstan as a 
presidential republic, but one in which the Supreme Soviet (parliament) still had significant 
powers. Parliamentary elections held in March 1994 gave a parliamentary majority to 
supporters of President (and former Communist Party First Secretary) Nursultan Nazarbayev 
and were criticized by OSCE observers as flawed. Nevertheless, the parliament still 
demonstrated considerable independence and even supported a vote of no-confidence in 
the government in May 1994. As a result, clearly under pressure from the president and his 
supporters, the Constitutional Court ruled in March 1995 that the parliament was 
illegitimate as a result of violations in the elections the previous year. Nazarbayev then 
dissolved parliament and, on the advice of an Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan (an 
organization that was supposed to represent all of Kazakhstan’s 101 nationalities but was, in 
reality, subservient to the will of the president), scheduled a referendum for 28 April to 
prolong his term of office until 2000, rather than standing for election in 1996 as originally 
scheduled. According to official results, 91.2% of voters turned out to vote and 96.2% of 
those casting valid ballots voted “yes”. The turnout figures, in particular, stretch the limits of 
credulity and it is likely that considerable ballot fraud occurred. 
 
Having dissolved parliament and having neutralized all threats to his continued hegemony, 
Nazarbayev ruled by presidential decree. He also announced his intention of amending the 
Constitution and set the pliant Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan the task of reviewing 
the Constitution article by article. On 1 August 1995, the text of the new Constitution was 
unveiled. Compared to the earlier 1993 constitution, it increased the president's powers 
significantly at the expense of parliament, giving him broad powers to dismiss the legislative 
body. Instead of the old single-chamber Supreme Soviet, a new two-chamber parliament 
with a 67-member lower house elected in single-mandate constituencies (Majilis) and a 47-
member upper house (Senate) representing the regions was put in place. Seven members of 
                                                          
27 Meruert Makhmutova, “Local Government in Kazakhstan”, in Igor Munteanu and Viktor Popa, 
Developing New Rules in the Old Environment (LGI Books: 2001) at 
http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2001/84/Ch8-Kazakstan.pdf.  
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the Senate were to be appointed directly by the president. Moreover, the parliament no 
longer would have powers to exercise budgetary oversight over the executive branch. The 
parliament was also given the right, with a two-thirds majority, to delegate legislative 
powers to the president for a one-year period. Finally, the Constitutional Court was replaced 
by a Constitutional Council with reduced powers. The new Constitution was put to a 
referendum on 30 August 1995 and, according to official results, was passed with 90% of 
those casting valid ballots voting “yes” on a 90.6% turnout. 
 
Once again, the turnout figures in the referendum are highly questionable. On 24 August an 
opinion poll showed that there was little public interest in the new Constitution. Of 1,500 
respondents in eight cities only 8% of voters said they had read it closely, 32% knew about 
the draft and 31% said they knew nothing about it.28 The poll also indicated that 52% of 
respondents intended to vote, of whom 71% supported the draft. According to the Chairman 
of the Human Rights Committee of Kazakhstan, in the 622 polling stations monitored by the 
opposition, only 34% turned out to vote.29 
 
The subsequent amendments to the constitution were passed by parliament alone on the 
initiative of the president. These included the 1998 amendments that extended the term of 
the office of the president from five to seven years, increased the size of the Majilis by ten 
members elected by party lists, extended the term of the Majilis from four to five years, 
extended the term of the Senate from four to six years and reduced the number of senators 
from 47 to 39 (although seven remained presidential appointees). Constitutional 
amendments were also made in 2007 to reduce the presidential term from seven to five 
years as of 2012, to allow the president to hold office for an unlimited number of terms, to 
reform the Majilis so that 98 members would be elected by proportional representation 
based on party lists (with a 7% threshold) and nine represent the Assembly of the Peoples of 
Kazakhstan, to increase the number of senators appointed by the president from seven to 
fifteen, to allow parliament to table a vote of no-confidence in the government and to 
appoint the prime minister. The apparent delegation of powers to parliament must be seen 
in the context of the creation of a party of power, Nur-Otan, which is fully controlled by the 
president and which won all 98 elected members of the Majilis in the August 2007 
parliamentary elections. 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives  
 
According to the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, a referendum is called by the president on his 
own initiative, on the initiative of a majority of members of the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament), 
or on the initiative of at least 300,000 voters. Prior to the constitutional amendments passed 
in 2007, there was a degree of ambiguity as to whether or not a referendum was required to 
amend the Constitution. According to Article 96.1, “[a]mendments and supplements to the 
                                                          
28 OMRI DAILY DIGEST, Vol. 1, No. 166, 25 August 1995, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1995/08/2-
tca/tca-250895.asp. 
29 OMRI DAILY DIGEST, Vol. 1, No. 172, 5 September 1995, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1995/09/2-
tca/tca-050995.asp. 
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present Constitution are adopted by referendum called by the President of the Kyrgyz 
Republic”, while Article 96.2 stated that amendments or supplements may be adopted in the 
houses of the parliament after a proposal by the president, by a majority of the total 
number of deputies of both houses of parliament, or by no fewer than 300,000 voters. This 
ambiguity was exploited by President Kurmanbek Bakiev when he called a constitutional 
referendum in September 2007 (see below). However, following the 2007 amendments, it 
was clarified that Chapters 3 to 8 of the Constitution (i.e. those parts that deal with the 
relative competences of the various branches of government) could be amended without 
recourse to a referendum, providing the amendments were approved by parliament. 
 
The Constitution grants legislative initiative to the president, members of parliament, the 
government, and a group of 30,000 voters (Article 64); however, there are no documented 
cases in which a popular initiative of 30,000 voters has been used to change legislation. 
 
According to the Law on Referendums (adopted 1991), a referendum is only valid if 50% of 
the registered electorate turn out to vote. Local councils can also call referendums. 
However, as the Law on Referendums refers only to national referendums, no legal 
procedures are in place to regulate such local referendums. A new draft of Law on 
Referendums was adopted in September 2007, but no details are yet available as to its 
content. 
 
According to Kyrgyz law, there is wide scope for community organizations to represent the 
interests of citizens to organs of local self-government or local executive authorities. 
According to the Law on Local Self-Governance and Local State Administration (2002 with 
subsequent amendments), citizens can participate in local self-government through village 
or community assemblies (known as kurultais) and other communal gatherings. Two forms 
of community organization are envisaged by the Law: kurultais and organs of territorial 
societal self-government. The former are convoked in response to a particular issue and 
provide non-binding recommendations for local councils or mayors, while the latter are 
voluntary organizations of citizens that operate at the level of the living block, street or 
village and can obtain legal status as an NGO. Organs of territorial societal self-government 
can take part in the work of local councils and also play a role in exercising a degree of social 
control by ensuring compliance with rules governing the use of common facilities. One type 
of organ of territorial societal self-government is the condominium association, regulated by 
the 1997 Law on Condominium Associations. According to one report, by 2000 there were 
approximately two hundred condominium associations in Kyrgyzstan.30 
 
In May 2001, President Askar Akaev issued a decree increasing the role of kurultais in local 
self-government. The decree established the use of kurultais in approving the draft 
programme for economic and social development that each mayor or local administrator 
has to develop within four months of assuming office.31 
 
                                                          
30 Emil Alymkulov and Marat Kulatov, “Local Government in the Kyrgyz Republic” in Igor Munteanu 
and Viktor Popa, Developing New Rules in the Old Environment (LGI Books: 2001) at 
http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2001/84/Ch10-Kyrgyzstan.pdf. 
31 Ibid.. 
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A similar mechanism of local community government in Kyrgyzstan is the institution of the 
aksakals. Aksakals (or ‘white beards’) are community elders (typically, but not always, senior 
in terms of age) who command respect. Since independence, the Kyrgyz authorities have 
attempted to formalize what was a hitherto an informal traditional institution. This was 
primarily the result of the incapacity of the state in the 1990s to provide basic law and order. 
In 1995 President Askar Akaev signed a decree authorizing the establishment of ‘aksakal 
courts’, to adjudicate over matters of administrative violations; property, family and other 
disputes; and minor crimes passed to them by state prosecutors. The courts were nominally 
elected by local residents, for a four-year period.32 However, rather than being a vehicle for 
democratization, it would appear that aksakal courts reinforced the authoritarian social 
norms that were already in place in parts of rural Kyrgyzstan. The courts were alleged to 
have meted out harsh punishments to those found guilty, including whipping. A man was 
also allegedly stoned to death in a small village in Talas region in 1995 after an aksakal court 
found him guilty of extortion.33 
 
More generally, critics have claimed that social institutions such as condominium 
associations and kurultais have done little to enhance direct democracy, since they are 
exploited by the executive branch at local level (appointed by the president) in an attempt 
to undermine the influence of elected institutions of local self-government (village and town 
councils). 
 
Referendums 
 
Altogether seven nationwide referendums have been held in Kyrgyzstan since 1991. The first 
was held in March 1991 together with the all-Union referendum on the preservation of the 
USSR. It proposed to give state sovereignty to Kyrgyzstan (though not independence) and 
was passed by 62.2% of voters. Following independence (declared on 30 August 1991 
following the failed August putch in Moscow by Kremilin hardliners), referendums in 
Kyrgyzstan have been primarily about consolidating power.  
 
The first Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, which was passed by the Supreme Soviet in May 1993, 
envisaged a presidential system with a clear separation of powers between the executive 
and the legislature with far-reaching powers for the latter. By the time of its passage, 
however, the Supreme Soviet was engaged in a bitter power struggle with President Askar 
Akaev. The parliament had been elected in February 1990 and contained a large number of 
Communist Party officials (including all 40 of the then district committee first secretaries), as 
well as directors of Soviet enterprises and collective farms (kolkhozes).34 Many of these 
individuals had independent power bases within their regions, feared the possibility of 
increased presidential authority and therefore sought to strip the president of his authority. 
Indeed on 3 May 1993, just two days before the new Constitution came into force, 
parliament voted to transfer the powers of the head of government from the president to 
                                                          
32 Ibid.. 
33 Amnesty International, “Kyrgyzstan: A Tarnished Human Rights Record”, at 
http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR580011996?open&of=ENG-2EU. 
34 Eugene Huskey, “The Rise of Contested Politics in Central Asia: Elections in Kyrgyzstan 1989-90”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 5 (Jul., 1995), pp. 813-833. 
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the prime minister. It also embarrassed Akaev by criticising the way the government had 
allotted development concessions over the country’s main gold deposits. Akaev responded 
to Parliament’s challenge by scheduling a popular referendum of confidence in himself for 
January 1994. He won with a questionable 97% of valid votes cast on a 96% turnout, and 
then began moves to consolidate his own position at the expense of Parliament’s.  
 
Akaev struck by arranging a boycott of parliament by his own supporters and then using the 
lack of a quorum to accuse his Communist opponents (mainly allies of former first secretary 
of the Kyrgyz Communist Party Absamat Masaliev) of sabotage. Then with the help of his 
parliamentary backers he contrived to have the Parliament dissolve itself in September 
1994, before announcing a constitutional referendum, which was held in October 1994, to 
establish a bicameral parliament with a 35-member upper house or Legislative Assembly 
that would sit permanently, and a 70-member part-time lower house or People’s Assembly 
that would sit infrequently. By dividing the parliament and attempting to ensure that the 
lower house sat only part-time, Akaev clearly hoped to weaken the legislative body. The 
referendum also contained a question that would allow the Constitution to be further 
amended by a referendum. Following the approval of both proposals with over 80% of the 
vote, the new parliament that was elected in February 1995 was far more pliant to the 
wishes of the President. Akaev took advantage of the right to amend the Constitution by 
calling yet another referendum in February 1996 to give the president the power to 
personally formulate domestic and foreign policy, to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers, 
ambassadors, and judges and to dissolve parliament if it fails three times to confirm his 
nominee as prime minister. According to official figures, it was passed with nearly 99% of 
valid ballots cast on a turnout of 96%. Once again, such high tunout figures raise serious 
suspicions of fraud. 
 
A third constitutional referendum was held on 17 October 1998 at the initiative of the 
president to further augment his powers. The referendum came despite the resistance of 
parliament, who, despite the legislature’s diminished authority, still managed to act as a 
forum for disgruntled local power brokers (especially from the south of the country) and had 
even, on occasions, been able to pass laws despite a presidential veto.35 The referendum 
was presented as a package of constitutional amendments to: (i) introduce private 
ownership of land, with the proviso of a five-year moratorium on the sale and purchase of 
agricultural land, (ii) strip the parliament of the right to discuss budgetary spending without 
government approval, (iii) to increase the number of deputies in the Legislative Assembly 
from 35 to 60 (with 15 members elected proportionally by party lists and the other 45 
elected from single-mandate constituencies) and to reduce the number of deputies in the 
People's Assembly from 70 to 45 (all elected from single-mandate constituencies), (iv) to 
allow deputies to be stripped of immunity in some cases, and (v) to increase somewhat the 
freedom of Kyrgyzstan's independent media. The referendum questions were was offered as 
a package, making it impossible to vote on individual amendments. According to official 
results, more than 95% of those casting valid ballots voted in favour of the amendments, on 
a 96% turnout. Once again, official results should be treated with the utmost scepticism, 
given the high turnout figure. 
                                                          
35 RFE/RL Newsline 9 September 1998, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/09/090998.asp. 
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Following events in the southern Kyrgyz town of Aksy in 2002, when the arrest of opposition 
deputy Azimbek Beknazarov and the subsequent deaths of five demonstrators at the hands 
of the security services provoked months of street protests in the south of the country, 
President Akaev called a Constitutional Council that included both representatives of the 
authorities and of the opposition and tasked it with amending the way the country was 
governed in the light of the crisis. The Council managed to produce a compromise proposal 
of constitutional changes that would limit the powers of the president and enhance those of 
parliament. However, on 2 January 2003 Akaev declared that he would no longer cooperate 
with the Constitutional Council and instead introduced constitutional amendments drawn 
up by a hand-picked group of seventeen of his own legal experts.36 On 13 January 2003 he 
scheduled a snap referendum for 2 February, giving little time for the public to become 
acquainted with the changes and instructing local authorities to ensure a favourable result.37 
The OSCE called for a postponement of the referendum on the grounds that there had been 
insufficient time for public discussion but their call went unheeded.38 Two issues were put to 
the Kyrgyz public. The first was to allow President Akaev to serve until 2005, when his five-
year term was due to end. This must be seen against the backdrop of calls for him to resign 
following the Aksy events. The second issue was to introduce a number of constitutional 
amendments, the most important of which was to restore a unicameral parliament 
consisting of 75 deputies, elected only from single-mandate constituencies. According to 
official results, around 90% of voters supported the two proposals on a turnout of 86.68%. 
However, the official results were widely disputed, and a delegation from the US-based 
National Democratic Institute, as well as a coalition of domestic observers called the 
“Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society” noted widespread violations by the executive 
authorities.39 
 
Following President Akaev’s hasty departure from the country in what became known as the 
‘Tulip Revolution’ in March 2005, his successor, Kurmanbek Bakiev, promised far-reaching 
constitutional reforms to transfer significant powers from the presidency to the parliament. 
However, Bakiev did not follow his words with actions and the reform process was put on 
hold. Following an incident in the autumn of 2006 in which opposition deputy and former 
speaker of Parliament Omurbek Tekebaev had heroin planted on him and Bakiev’s brother 
was implicated in the plot to discredit him, opposition supporters came out onto the streets 
demanding that Bakiev fulfil his promised constitutional reforms. The protests reached a 
peak in early November when over 10,000 ‘For Reforms’ supporters gathered in Bishkek’s 
Ala-Too Square, prompting Bakiev to sign a series of constitutional amendments that more 
or less corresponded to the opposition’s demands. Nevertheless, at the end of December 
                                                          
36 RFE/RL Central Asia report, Vol.3, No.3 (16 January 2003) at 
http://www.rferl.org/reports/centralasia/2003/01/3-160103.asp. 
37 International Crisis Group, “Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects” (Asia Report 
No. 81, Osh/Brussels, 11 August 2004) at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2905&l=1. 
38 Eurasianet “Contentious Constitutional Referendum Campaign Winding Down in Kyrgyzstan” (30 
January 2003) at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav013003.shtml. 
39 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “Kyrgyz Republic Constitutional Referendum 2 
February 2003: Political assessment Report” at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/03/1381_en.pdf. 
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Bakiev managed to cajole the Parliament to pass another set of hastily-drafted constitutional 
amendments that restored many of the transferred powers back to the president. 
 
The pressure on Bakiev eased somewhat in April 2007 as the authorities put down a wave of 
public protests led by Bakiev’s arch rival and former ally, Felix Kulov, and Bakiev was able to 
successfully co-opt another of the leaders of the opposition, Almaz Atambaev, by making 
him prime minister. By the autumn Bakiev was secure enough in his position to instigate 
constitutional changes of his own. The pretext he used was a ruling by the Constitutional 
Court on 14 September that declared the 2006 constitutional amendments illegal on the 
grounds that they had not been put to a referendum (see above). On 19 September, he 
issued a decree putting his own new constitutional amendments to a referendum, together 
with amendments to the electoral code. The proposed constitutional amendments 
maintained the dominance of the presidency and even broadened the powers of the 
president somewhat, for example by giving the president the right to appoint and dismiss 
the heads of local administration ‘in consultation with the prime minister’ but sparing him 
the necessity of obtaining the consent of local keneshes (councils). They also increased the 
number of parliamentary deputies to 90 and stipulated that all deputies be elected through 
party lists. Finally, the initiative for proposing a prime minister was now bestowed on the 
political party that wins more than 50% of seats in parliamentary elections or, failing that, a 
parliamentary coalition uniting a majority of deputies. This can be seen in the context of 
efforts underway by the authorities to form a ‘party of power’, called Ak-Zol Eldik (Best Path 
Popular), which won 71 out of 90 seats in the elections held in December 2007. As well as a 
proposal to amend the constitution, an additional proposal was put to voters in order to 
amend the Electoral Code in conformity with the constitutional changes. 
 
According to official results, 81.6% of voters turned out for the referendum, which took 
place on 21 October 2007. 95.4% of valid votes were cast in support of the constitutional 
changes and the amendments to the electoral code.40 The opposition rejected the official 
results, claiming that only around 35% of voters had come to the polling stations. Similarly, 
the head of the OSCE Center in Bishkek, Markus Mueller, expressed concern about reports 
of a “high number of irregularities” during the referendum.41 
 
Moldova 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives 
  
According to the Constitution of Moldova, “problems of utmost gravity or urgency 
confronting the Moldovan society or state shall be resolved by referendum” (Article 75). 
Until constitutional amendments were passed in 2000, a referendum had to be held in order 
to remove the president from office (Article 89), but subsequently the issue could be 
decided by a qualified majority of the Parliament. Finally, a referendum must be held to alter 
“provisions [of the Constitution] regarding the sovereignty, independence and unity of the 
                                                          
40 See http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/k/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-
constitutional-referendum-2007.html; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyrgyzstani_constitutional_referendum,_2007.  
41 RFE/RL Newsline, 23 October 2007, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2007/10/231007.asp.  
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state, as well as those regarding the permanent neutrality of the state” (Article 142). 
According to the Constitution, a group of at least 200,000 citizens including at least 5,000 
citizens from at least half of the country’s districts and municipalities can launch initiatives to 
revise the Constitution (Article 141). Such initiatives would then have to be approved by a 
two-thirds majority in parliament and with the consent of at least four out of six judges in 
the Constitutional Court (Articles 141 and 143). 
 
The procedure for holding referendums is laid out in considerable detail in the Electoral 
Code (1997 with subsequent amendments, most recently in 2007). Article 143 of the Code 
defines three types of republic-wide referendums: constitutional, legislative and consultative 
(non-binding). A republic-wide referendum may be initiated by: a) at least 200,000 citizens, 
b) no less than a third of members of parliament, c) the president or d) the government 
(Article 144). The following issues may not be put to a referendum: a) issues relating to the 
state budget or taxes, b) issues relating to amnesty or pardon, c) extraordinary or 
emergency measures concerning public order, health or security, d) electing or dismissing 
persons whose positions are the competence of parliament, the government or the 
president and e) issues that fall under the competence of judicial or prosecution bodies 
(Article 147). 
 
Citizens have the right to initiate a referendum. To do so, they must establish an initiative 
group at a meeting attended by at least 300 participants. No later than ten days before the 
meeting the initiators are required to inform the local authorities where and when the 
meeting is to be held and what its purpose is. If a majority of those attending the meeting 
vote in favour of holding the referendum, an initiative group is established of at least a 
hundred citizens, who will organize the collection of the required 200,000 signatures (Article 
152). The initiative group must be registered with the Central Election Commission and 
signatures must be collected within a time frame of three months at the most (Article 153). 
According to Article 171 of the Electoral Code, the results of a national referendum are only 
valid if 60% of registered voters participate in that referendum. 
 
The Electoral Code also regulates local referendums, which can be used to decide issues of 
special interest for the village, town, district or special-status administrative-territorial units 
(i.e. Gagauzia) or to dismiss town or village mayors (Article 177). A local referendum may be 
initiated by: a) ten per cent of citizens able to vote that are residents of the relevant 
administrative-territorial unit, b) mayors of villages or towns (except in cases where a 
referendum on their dismissal has already been initiated), c) half of all elected councillors in 
the relevant administrative-territorial unit, or, if the referendum concerns the dismissal of 
the mayor, two-thirds of elected councillors, or d) the representative bodies of special status 
administrative-territorial units (Article 180). 
 
To initiate a local referendum, a citizens’ initiative group must be established of at least 20 
citizens eligible to vote and residing in the relevant administrative-territorial unit. At least 30 
citizens must participate in the founding meeting of the initiative group. At least three days 
before the meeting, the initiators must inform the mayor.  The initiative group must register 
with the local public administration, or, if the referendum concerns the dismissal of the 
mayor, with the district or municipal court. The required number of signatures (10% of 
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registered voters) must be collected within a specified period that must not exceed 60 days 
(Article 181). According to Article 198 of the Electoral Code, the results of a local referendum 
are only valid if at least half of registered voters participate in that referendum, but can be 
revoked by the votes of at least two-thirds of local councillors. 
 
Referendums 
 
Since independence, only two republic-wide referendums and just one officially-recognized 
local referendum have been held in the Republic of Moldova in the post-independence 
period. The first referendum was passed on 6 March 1994. The issue was on whether 
Moldova should conserve its independence and territorial integrity. The precise formulation 
of the question was as follows: “Do you want the Republic of Moldova to develop as an 
independent and unitary state, in the frontiers recognized in the day where Moldova 
declared sovereignty, to promote a policy of neutrality and to maintain mutually-benefiting 
economic relations with all the countries of the world, and to guarantee its citizens equal 
rights, according to international law?”42 The importance of the issue relates both to the 
view among some nationalists that it would be better to “reunify” with Romania and also to 
the need to restore Moldovan sovereignty over the breakaway region of Transdniestria. 
Turnout for the referendum was 75% and over 95% supported the proposal, dealing a blow 
to those who wished for union with Romania. 
 
A new constitution for Moldova was drafted in late 1993, but was only approved by the 
Supreme Soviet (parliament) in July 1994, i.e. after the February 1994 elections. It was not 
put to a referendum and became law in August 1994. 
 
The second all-republican referendum was a consultative referendum on the Constitution 
held on 23 May 1999. It occurred against the backdrop of conflict between the parliament, 
which was becoming increasingly dominated by the Communist Party (which controlled 40 
out of 101 seats), and the president, Petru Lucinschi. The 1994 Constitution had defined a 
mixed system of government that was a compromise between a presidential system and a 
prime ministerial-parliamentary system. The president was directly elected and had broad 
powers over matters of national defence (as commander-in-chief of the armed forces), but 
his government was responsible first and foremost to the parliament, which could pass a 
motion of no-confidence in the government. Following the resignation of prime minister Ion 
Cuibuc on 1 February 1999, parliament could not agree on Lucinschi’s nominee as his 
replacement, Serafim Urechemu, and only passed Lucinschi’s second nominee, Ion Sturdza, 
by the narrowest of margins six weeks later. Lucinschi therefore initiated a consultative 
referendum to augment his powers. The proposal put to voters in the referendum took the 
following wording: 
 
“Do you support amending the Constitution in order to introduce a presidential form of 
government in Moldova, in which the president of the republic shall be responsible for 
                                                          
42 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moldovan_referendum,_1994. 
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forming and leading the government, as well as for the results of the country’s 
governance.”43 
 
In the referendum a majority of those casting a valid ballot voted in favour of the proposal. 
As only 58% of the voters turned out to vote, however, many argued that the referendum 
was invalid as it fell below the 60% threshold. However, the wording of the Electoral Code at 
the time was that a referendum “may be declared invalid” below the 60% threshold. This 
ambiguity allowed the Constitutional Court to declare the referendum valid on 16 June. 
However, as it was a consultative referendum, it still required a two-thirds majority in 
parliament to pass it. Meanwhile, parliamentarians elaborated their own proposal for a 
parliamentary system of government with a president elected by members of parliament. 
On 5 July 2000 parliament approved a law on constitutional reform based on these 
proposals. Although the bill was vetoed by the president, on 21 July parliament was able to 
overturn the veto by a massive majority of 87 votes to six.44  
 
Following the passage of the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri) on 23 
December 1994, which gave a degree of autonomy to the still-undefined region of Gagauzia, 
local referendums were held to determine the boundaries of the new entity. According to 
the law, all localities in which ethnic Gagauzians made up at least 50% of the population 
automatically became a part of Gagauzia and those in which at least a third of the 
population expressed a desire to join the region through a petition could vote by local 
referendum whether or not to join. The local referendum, held in all Gagauz localities, would 
also determine the location of the capital of Gagauzia. Information about the number of 
localities in which the referendum took place and the results of voting in each locality is 
sketchy and often contradictory; most sources indicate that voting took place in thirty-six 
localities, including those twenty-seven localities in which there was a majority Gagauz 
population. As a result of the referendum, which was held on 5 March 1995, twenty-three 
communes including thirty-two localities (twenty-nine villages, two cities and one 
municipality) voted to become a part of the new administrative-territorial unit, suggesting a 
“no” vote in four localities. The referendum also made Komrat the capital of Gagauzia, 
supported by 54.4% of voters, compared with 42.4% for Chadyr-Lunga. According to one 
report, overall turnout was 79% and Council of Europe observers described the vote as fair.45 
                                                          
43 Ian Jeffries, The Countries of the Former Soviet Union at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: The 
Baltic and European States in Transition ( London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 29.  
44 RFE/RL Newsline, 21 July 2000, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/07/210700.asp. 
45 Jeffries, The Countries of the Former Soviet Union at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 328; Claus 
Neukirch, “Autonomy and Conflict Transformation: The Case of the Gagauz Territorial Autonomy in 
the Republic of Moldova, in: Kinga Gal (Ed.), Minority Governance in Europe, Budapest 2002 (Series 
on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues, Vol. I), 105-23 at 
http://www.ecmimoldova.org/fileadmin/ecmimoldova.org/docs/Gagauz.Pub/C.Neukirch-
Autonomy%20and%20Conflict%20Transformation%20The%20gagauz%20Territorial%20Autonomy%2
0in%20the%20Republic%20of%20Moldova.pdf; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gagauzia; Research 
Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Moldova State Protection (Issue Paper, 
March 1995) at http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/en/research/publications/index_e.htm?cid=0&docid=260&version=printable&disclaimer=sh
ow RFE/RL Newsline, 7 March 1995 at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1995/03/070395.asp; RFE/RL 
Newsline, 7 March 1995 at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1995/03/060395.asp.  
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Unofficial referendums have also been held in the territory of Moldova. In the self-declared 
republic of Transnistria, an unauthorized referendum was held on 26 March 1995 to prevent 
the withdrawal of the Russian Fourteenth Army under General Alexander Lebed. According 
to the separatist authorities, 91.3% of voters voted to retain the Russian army.46 Another 
referendum was held in Transnistria on 17 September 2006, this time on the independence 
of the enclave. The referendum included two proposals: 1) Should Transdniester seek 
independence and possible integration with Russia? 2) Should Transnistria abandon its quest 
for independence and integrate with Moldova? According to the separatist authorities, 
97.1% of voters voted in favour of the first proposal and 95% voted against the second 
proposal.47 
 
Similarly, there was an unofficial referendum in Taraclia on 24 January 1999, an area in 
which Moldova’s Bulgarian minority is concentrated, that proposed making Taraclia district a 
separate county. The referendum was held by the local authorities in Taraclia in response to 
an administrative reform passed by parliament in late 1998, which incorporated Taraclia into 
Cahul County. The referendum was passed but was not recognized by the Moldovan Central 
Election Commission. The conflict was resolved in October, when Taraclia was made into a 
county of its own. 48 
 
Despite the legislation that facilitates the holding of referendums on citizens’ initiatives both 
at national and local level, there are no documented instances of such referendums being 
held. 
 
The Russian Federation 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives  
 
In the Russian Federation it is not necessary to hold a referendum to adopt constitutional 
changes. According to Article 135 of the Constitution, if a proposal to amend Chapters 1, 2 
and 9 of the Constitution is supported by a three-fifths majority in both the lower and upper 
houses of parliament (the State Duma and the Federation Council), a Constitutional 
Assembly will be convened, which will either approve or reject the changes. In order to be 
enacted, the relevant constitutional changes must either be approved by two-thirds of the 
members of the Constitutional Assembly, or adopted by a popular referendum in which at 
least half of the total electorate participate and over of those who participate support the 
changes. Similarly, according to Article 136, amendments to Chapters 3-8 of the 
Constitution, i.e. those dealing with the distribution of powers between the various 
branches of government, come into force providing “they are approved by the bodies of 
legislative power of not less than two thirds of the subjects of the Russian Federation.” By 
“subjects of the Russian Federation” the Constitution is here referring to the 83 federated 
units (see below). 
                                                          
46 Jeffries, The Countries of the Former Soviet Union at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 328.  
47 RFE/RL Newsline, 18 September 2006, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2006/09/180906.asp. 
48 Kaarlo Tuori, “Notes on the Fact-Finding Trip to Chisinau (22-26 May 1999)” (Venice Commission) at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1999/CDL(1999)029-e.asp. 
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According to the 1995 federal constitutional law on referendums, a referendum cannot be 
held on such matters as recall of the president of the Russian Federation, dissolution of the 
parliament, prolongation of the terms of the president or parliament, postponement of 
elections or holding by-elections, adoption or amendment of the federal budget, changes to 
or fulfillment of the financial commitments to the state, change or cancellation of federal 
taxes, changing the status of a federated unit, extraordinary measures to protect public 
health and security, as well as amnesty and mercy. All other matters can be the subject of a 
national referendum.49 
 
The Russian Federation consists of 83 federated entities: autonomous republics, provinces, 
regions and national homelands (autonomous okrugs), as well as two federal cities (Moscow 
and St.Petersburg). Referendums can be held at the level of the federated unit, although at 
this level the referendum will be regulated by regional legislation, which may be different in 
different federated entities. 
 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation also envisages a role for referendums in local 
self-government. According to Article 130, “[l]ocal self-government shall be exercised by 
citizens through a referendum, election, other forms of direct expression of the will of the 
people, through elected and other bodies of local self-government.” The scope of the local 
referendum is developed further in the Law on Local Self-Government, which asserts the 
(theoretical) independence of decisions made by referendums from local executive power 
structures. According to Article 22, “a decision made by local referendum does not require 
approval by bodies of state power, state officials or local self-government bodies. If a 
regulatory act must be issued in order for such a decision to be implemented, the relevant 
local government body shall pass the required act.” 
 
Procedures for holding referendums are set out in detail in the Law “On basic guarantees of 
electoral rights and the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to participate in a 
referendum”. According to Article 12 of the Law, a referendum at local level and at the level 
of the federated entity cannot be held to revoke the authority of bodies of state power or of 
individual deputies or officials, to call early elections, or to address issues of personal 
membership of bodies of state power. Neither can such referendums be used to amend 
budgets or to adopt extraordinary measures to ensure the health and security of the 
population. The Law also allows the formation of an initiative group by any citizen, group of 
citizens or public association (Article 14). The number of members in an initiative group must 
be not less than 100 for national referendums, not less than 20 for referendums at the level 
of the federated unit, and not less than 10 for local referendums. The group must also apply 
for registration with the relevant local and national election commissions which examine the 
referendum questions to judge whether or not they are in conformity with the law. The 
referendum questions must also be approved by the relevant legislative (representative) 
body, i.e. the parliament of the federated entity in which the referendum is held or the 
                                                          
49 Alexei Avtonomov, “Russian Federation” in Andreas Auer and Michael Bützer (eds), Direct 
Democracy: The Eastern and Central European Experience (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001), 155. 
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relevant body of local self-government. If approved, the relevant election commission will 
register the initiative group (Article 36). 
 
Once registered the initiative group for a referendum will attempt to collect the number of 
signatures required by law. This shall not exceed shall not exceed two percent of the number 
of referendum participants registered on the territory of the referendum, and, in the case of 
an initiative to hold a local referendum, shall not exceed five percent of the number of 
referendum participants registered on the territory of the referendum (Article 37). 
 
In addition to holding local referendums, Article 25 of the Law on Local Self-government 
grants citizens the right to legislative initiative on matters of local importance: “Bills on 
issues of local importance submitted by the citizenry to local government bodies are subject 
to mandatory consideration at open sessions attended by representatives of the public.” 
However, there have been few cases in which such initiatives have been made. According to 
one observer, “alternative municipal charters were drafted in at least eleven out of forty-
one municipalities in Saratov oblast, but none of these drafts was presented in an open 
session or put to the vote.”50 
 
Referendums 
 
There have been only three nationwide referendums held in the Russian Federation. The 
first was held on 17 March 1991 simultaneously with the all-Union referendum on the 
preservation of the USSR and the proposal it contained was to establish the elected post of 
President of the Russian Federation. According to official figures, turnout was 75.1% and 
71.4% of valid votes were cast in favour of the proposal.51 This paved the way for 
presidential elections in June 1991, which Boris Yeltsin won with 57% of the vote. 
 
The other two referendums both took place in 1993 against the backdrop of an increasingly 
acrimonious conflict between President Yeltsin and the Congress of People’s Deputies. After 
the Congress refused to confirm Yeltsin’s choice of prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, in 
December 1992, the conflict was temporarily assuaged by a compromise agreement 
between Yeltsin and the parliamentary speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. The compromise 
covered the following points: the need to schedule a national referendum for April 1993 to 
frame a new Constitution, to extend most of Yeltsin's emergency powers until the 
referendum, to preserve the right of the Congress to nominate and approve its own choice 
of prime minister, and to give parliament the right to reject the president’s choice of 
Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Interior, and Minister of State 
Security. Yeltsin and the Congress also agreed on a compromise candidate for prime 
minister—Viktor Chernomyrdin.  
 
However, tensions once again increased in early 1993, as the Congress gradually repealed 
the extraordinary powers it had granted Yeltsin in late 1991. Yeltsin set the referendum for 
                                                          
50 Galina Kourliandskaia, Yelena Nikolayenko and Natalia Golovanova, “Local Government in the 
Russian Federation” in Igor Munteanu and Viktor Popa, Developing New Rules in the Old Environment 
(LGI Books: 2001) at http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2001/84/Ch4-Russia.pdf. 
51 Search Engine for Direct Democracy at http://www.sudd.ch/event.php?id=ru011991. 
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11 April, but the Congress promptly cancelled it. Yeltsin responded by introducing a decree 
giving him the right of extraordinary executive power pending the results of the referendum, 
which he rescheduled for April 25 and which he announced would concern the timing of 
new legislative elections, the drafting of a new constitution, and public confidence in the 
president and vice president. The vice president was Yeltsin’s arch-rival, Alexander Rutskoy.  
The Congress then attempted to impeach Yeltsin, but fell 72 votes short of the 689 votes 
needed to obtain the required two-thirds majority to do so. At the same time, Congress 
insisted on imposing their own questions for referendum; specifically on confidence in the 
President, on approval of his reforms and on early presidential and legislative elections. They 
also passed a vote stipulating that in order to win Yeltsin would have to win a majority of all 
registered electors (not just a majority of those voting); however, the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the president would require a simple majority on the issue of confidence in his 
presidency and on approval of his economic policies. A majority of all electors would be 
required for the calling of new elections. 
 
The questions put to the electorate on 25 April 1993 were the following: 
 
1) Do you have confidence in Boris Yeltsin, the President of Russia. 
2) Do you approve the social and economic policy of the President of Russia and 
Russia's Government since 1992? 
3) Do you consider early presidential elections necessary? 
4) Do you consider early elections of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation 
necessary? 
 
A majority of those participating in the vote voted “yes” to all questions except (3), where a 
“no” vote prevailed by a narrow margin. Two-thirds of those participating voted “yes” to 
question (4), but this was still a little less than half of all registered voters. 
 
The referendum did not signal the end of the power struggle between president and 
Congress, however. Following the referendum, Yeltsin decreed the establishment of a 
constitutional convention uniting political institutions, public organizations and political 
parties to examine the draft constitution that he had presented in April. The Constitutional 
Committee of the Congress also decided to participate and presented its own draft 
constitution. However, the two main drafts differed significantly in terms of division of 
powers between the executive and legislature and the draft that finally emerged on 12 July, 
which envisaged a bicameral parliament that the president would have the right to dissolve, 
was unacceptable to the Congress.  
 
Amid the increasing escalation between Yeltsin and the Congress, Yeltsin dissolved the latter 
on 21 September. However, the deputies remained holed up in the building and declared 
Rutskoy president. As tension increased, Yeltsin cut off electricity, telephones and hot water 
to the Congress. The standoff ended after a pitched battle for the national television centre, 
in which over 60 people died, and the storming of the White House building (where 
Congress was barricaded) on October 4 by Russian army units in which many more were 
killed. Both Rutskoy and the Chairman of the Congress Ruslan Khasbulatov were arrested 
and taken away in buses. Free of the Congress, Yeltsin then ruled by decree and set 12 
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December as the date for a referendum on his favoured Constitution to take place 
simultaneously with parliamentary elections. The referendum narrowly approved the new 
Constitution with 58% of valid votes cast on a 55% turnout, which would allow the president 
to dissolve parliament if it rejected his choice of prime minister three times or if it passed a 
motion of no confidence in the government. Andrew Wilson estimates that turnout in the 
referendum was probably below 50% and that of those voting it is quite possible that less 
than 50% voted in favour. He points to a major discrepancy in the number of valid ballots in 
the parliamentary elections (53.8 million) and the referendum (56.4 million) and suggests 
that a number of ‘dead souls’ were added to the latter.52 
 
In terms of regional referendums, a regional vote was held in Chechnya on 23 March 2003 
with the aim of cementing the centre’s new-found hegemony in the region during the latter 
stages of a long and bitter war. The referendum was called by President Putin and the pro-
Russian Chechen administration, led by Akhmad Kadyrov. It was intended to undermine the 
position of the separatist leader, Aslan Maskhadov, who had been elected president of 
Chechnya in 1997, and to pave the way for new presidential elections that would anoint 
Kadyrov as president. It was also aimed at approving a new Chechen constitution, which 
confirmed Chechnya as subordinate to Russia. The questions put to voters in the 
referendum were the following: 
 
1) Do you accept the holding of new legislative elections? 
2) Do you accept the holding of presidential election? 
3) Do you accept the new constitution? 
 
According to official results, almost 90% of voters turned out to vote and around 96% of 
these supported all three proposals. The turnout figures stretch the limits of credulity and 
suggest significant falsification. An opinion poll conducted by the Russian human rights 
association shortly before the referendum suggested that only 12% of Chechens had 
intended taking part in the poll.53 
 
A second referendum was held in Chechnya on 2 December 2007 to coincide with elections 
to the Russian State Duma. Two proposals were submitted to voters for approval. The first 
involved amendments to the Chechen Constitution. These amendments included the 
replacement of the two-chamber legislature with a unicameral parliament, the 
establishment of Chechen and Russian as official languages, the extension of the term of 
office for the head of the republic from four to five years and the abolition of direct elections 
for the head of the republic. This last amendment was designed to bring Chechnya in line 
with other subjects of the Federation, after a law enacted in December 2004 eliminated the 
direct election of the country’s regional leaders (see below). The second proposal involved 
the abolition of the old electoral law for the Chechen parliament. According to official 
                                                          
52 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2005), p.75. 
53 Prague Watchdog, 27 March 2003 at http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000004-000001-
000068&lang=1. 
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figures, a highly suspect 99.1% of voters were said to have turned out to vote and 96.9% of 
valid votes were allegedly cast in favour of the two proposals.54 
 
In 2003 President Vladimir Putin had begun a policy of consolidating the regions of the 
Russian Federation by merging small and economically weak subjects of the Federation with 
larger and more prosperous ones. However, the motive was not purely economic—the 
Kremlin was at the same time attempting to reduce the political autonomy of the regions. In 
this respect the Kremlin-backed law enacted in December 2004 to abolish elections for 
regional governors and to give the president of the Russian Federation the power to 
nominate the presidents of autonomous republics and regional governors is also significant. 
Moreover, it is no coincidence that the mergers of Federation subjects involved the 
dissolution of previously autonomous regions that had originally been established on the 
principle of ethnicity: Komi-Permyatski Autonomous Okrug, Evensk Autonomous Okrug, 
Taymyr (Dlogan-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug, Koryak Autonomous Okrug, Ust-Orda Buryat 
Autonomous Okrug and Agin Buryat Autonomous Okrug. As a result of the mergers, the 
number of autonomous okrugs (national homelands) fell from ten to four. Superficially, it 
could be argued that the mergers came about through the exercise of direct democracy as 
all mergers were approved by popular referendum. In reality, it was a top-down exercise in 
power consolidation in which citizens had minimal impact. 
 
Five such mergers have taken place since 2003, all of which have been approved by 
referendum. On 7 December 2003 (coinciding with elections to the Russian Duma) a 
referendum was held in Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug and Perm Oblast to merge the 
two entities into a unified Perm Krai. According to official results, 84.89% of voters in Perm 
and 89.69% of voters in Komi-Permyak supported the proposal with an overall turnout of 
62.67%.55  The new merged entity was born on 1 December 2005. The next referendum was 
held on 17 April 2005 to merge Evensk Autonomous Okrug and Taymyr (Dlogan-Nenets) 
Autonomous Okrug into Krasnoyarsk Krai. The consolidated region came into being on 1 
January 2007. The merger was ostensibly supported by 92.4% of voters in Krasnoyarsk, 
69.95% in Taymyr and 79.87% in Evensk.56  The third merger—between Kamchatka Oblast 
and Koryak Autonomous Okrug—was approved by referendum on 23 October 2005, with 
84.87% of voters supposedly supporting the proposal in Kamchatka and 89.04% in Koryak. 
                                                          
54 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 22 June 2007 at 
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2007/06/220607.asp; Izbiratiel’naia Komissiia Chechenskoi 
Riespublika (website of the Chechen Electoral Commission) at 
http://www.chechen.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/chechen?action=show&root=1&tvd=2202000
92757&vrn=220200092756&region=20&global=&sub_region=20&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=220
200092757&type=232. 
55 J. Paul Goode, “The Push for Regional Enlargement in Putin’s Russia”, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.20, 
No.3 (July-September 2004). 
56 See Konstantin Simonov (ed.), Russia 2005: Report on Transformation (Instytut Wschodni, 
publication for II Europe – Russia Forum, Vilnius, March 23–24, 2006), Chapter 9.Regional 
Development – Sustaining Of Federal Tendencies at http://www.forum-
ekonomiczne.pl/docs/reportRu2006chapter09.pdf. 
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Turnout was 76.71% in Koryak and 52.23% in Kamchatka.57 The newly merged Kamchatka 
Krai was formed on 1 July 2007. The next referendum was held on 16 April 2006 in Irkutsk 
Oblast and Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug on the merger of the latter into the former. 
According to official results, turnout was 68.98% in Irkutsk oblast and 99.51% in Ust-Orda 
Buryatia and the “yes” vote was 89.77% in Irkutsk and 97.79% in Ust-Orda Buryatia. The very 
high turnout in Ust-Orda Buryatia raises questions about the extent to which the 
referendum was free and fair. The last of the ‘merger referendums’ to be held to date 
occurred on 11 March 2007 and involved the merger of the Agin Buryat Autonomous Okrug 
and Chita Oblast into Zabaykalsky Krai. The Central Election Commission reported 89.9% 
turnout in Agin Buryat and 80.4% in Chita, with approval of the merger given as 94% and 
90.29% respectively.58 Buryat human rights activists reported instances of disinformation, 
harassment, intimidation and ballot-rigging.59 It is likely that the “merger referendums” will 
continue, as the Kremlin eventually wants to reduce the number of subjects of the Russian 
Federation from the current 83 to less than 50. 
 
Finally, a number of local referendums have been held in the Russian Federation, although 
there is little documentation is available about the manner in which they were held. A 
significant number were held in the late 1990s; seven local referendums were held in the 
first half of 1998, including two in the Volgoda district to adopt a charter for one district and 
to amend the charter of another, four in the Kamchatka region to adopt charters in one 
town and three districts, and one in the town of Gelendzhik on the construction of a new 
cargo seaport. The last was not considered valid as less that 50% of resident turned out to 
vote. Similarly a number of sub-national referendums took place on the same day as the 
parliamentary elections of 19 December 1999.60 However, most of these referendums 
appear to have been instigated by the local authorities, rather than by citizens. 
 
One example of an independent initiative was that of a local referendum held in the 
Kostroma region of Russia in December 1996 as a result of an initiative by the environmental 
NGOs “In the Name of Life" and Greenpeace Russia on the building of a nuclear power plant. 
58% of voters in the region went to the polls and 87% rejected the construction of the plant.  
After protracted debates on whether or not the referendum was legal, on 20 July 2000 the 
Kostroma regional Duma adopted a resolution annulling its earlier decision to allow 
construction. However, in early 2007, they voted to repeal the 2000 resolution, giving the 
go-ahead for the construction of the plant.61 
                                                          
57 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 25 October 2005 at 
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/10/251005.asp. 
58 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 March 2007 at 
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2007/03/120307.asp. 
59 Terry Glavin, “ The Land Democracy Forgot”, Ottowa Citizen (July 12 2007) at 
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/views/story.html?id=5bd58f2a-baaa-4943-817c-
92f70d561065&k=30294. 
60 Avtonomov, “Russian Federation”, 166-67. 
61 Dmitry Efremenko, “Public Participation in the Debate and Decision Making in Energy Policy: A 
Russian View” (August 2006) at http://www.itas.fzk.de/tatup/062/efre06a.htm; Rashid Alimov, 
“Lawmakers revive proposed NPP in Kostroma Region, overriding a referendum against it”, Bellona 
(13 March 2007) at http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2007/kostroma_npp. 
C2D Working Paper Series 28/2008 
 
34 
 
Tajikistan 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives  
 
According to Article 98 of the Constitution of Tajikistan, a referendum is required to make 
changes and additions to the Constitution. A referendum can be initiated either by the 
president or by two-thirds of the members of the Majlis of Representatives (lower house).  
According to Article 99, “amendments to the Constitution shall be proposed by the President 
or at least by two thirds of the total number of the members of the Majlisi Milli [Upper 
House] and deputies of the Majlis of Representatives.” No provision is made for local 
referendums and the legislation does not envisage any other forms of direct democracy. 
 
Referendums  
 
Tajikistan has held three referendums since independence, all of which concerned the 
Constitution or the amendment thereof. During the Tajik civil war, which began in June 
1992, a coalition of regional groupings dominated by Tajiks from the Kulob region and 
supported by Russia rapidly gained the upper hand. In November 1992, the Supreme Soviet 
(parliament) elected Emomali Rakhmon, a native of Kulob, as its Chairman and Head of 
State. In 1994 the Supreme Soviet scheduled a referendum on a new Constitution that 
envisaged a presidential republic as well as simultaneous presidential elections (thereby 
assuming that the Constitution would be approved). Both the referendum and presidential 
elections were held on 6 November 1994. Itar-Tass reported a turnout figure of 2,338,356 
out of 2,647,398 eligible voters (88%), while Dushanbe radio gave figures of 2,409,330 out of 
a possible 2,535,754 voters (95%). Whatever the figure, such a high turnout is highly unlikely 
given that opposition forces in Gorno-Badakhshan announced a boycott of the process. 
According to official results, 90% of voters approved the referendum. CSCE observers were 
not present.62 
 
After a power-sharing deal known as the Tajik Peace and Reconciliation Accord was signed 
between President Rakhmon and the United Tajik Opposition in June 1997 to end the civil 
war, a national Reconciliation Council was formed to discuss the implementation of the 
accord. In February 1999, the Council recommended creating a bicameral parliament and 
these ideas were included in proposals that were put to a referendum on 26 September 
1999. In all, the amendments provided for creating a bicameral parliament, extending the 
president's term in office from five to seven years, and allowing the formation of religious-
based political parties (given that one of the main opposition groupings was the Islamic 
Renaissance Party). According to official results, 75% of valid ballots were cast in favour of 
the amendments on a 93% turnout. Once again the high turnout figures give grounds for 
scepticism. 
 
                                                          
62 RFE/RL, Tajikistan Votes 2005: Dates Related to Elections, Officials and Policy at 
http://rferl.org/specials/tajikelections/timeline1994.asp. 
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Immediately after the referendum, blatantly rigged presidential elections were held in which 
Rakhmon emerged once again as victor. The United Tajik Opposition had pulled out of the 
Central Election Commission prior to the elctions in protest and expelled one of its leaders, 
first deputy prime minister Hoja Akbar Turajonzoda, for his proximity to the authorities. 
Having divided the opposition, Rakhmon gradually consolidated power, marginalizing and 
dismissing those opposition members who gained posts as part of the power sharing deal. 
By 2003, he had succeeded in neutralizing the opposition and called a referendum to 
consolidate his position. The referendum that was held on 22 June 2003 proposed a number 
of constitutional amendments, the most controversial of which aimed to allow President 
Rakhmon to stand for a further two seven-year terms as president once his current term 
expired in 2006. Official results indicated a “yes” vote of over 93% on a turnout of over 96%, 
a result that was hardly plausible. According to the leader of the opposition Democratic 
Party of Tajikistan, Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, only around 20% of eligible voters participated 
in the referendum.63 
 
Turkmenistan 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives 
  
According to the Constitution of Turkmenistan, parliament can be prematurely dissolved by 
decision of a referendum (Article 64). According to Article 94, both national and local 
referendums can be used to decide the most important questions of governmental and 
social life. Moreover, a national referendum can be called by the People’s Council (the 
President, all members of parliament, the People's Advisors, one of whom is elected by the 
people from each district, the Chair of the Supreme Court, the Chair of the High Commercial 
Court, the General Prosecutor, the members of the Cabinet of Ministers, the heads of 
regional administrations, and the heads of the municipal councils of towns and of those 
villages which are the administrative centers of their respective districts) on the initiative of 
no less than a quarter of its members or by a minimum of 250,000 citizens who have the 
right to vote (Article 95). Finally, a local referendum can be called by a local meeting at its 
discretion or upon the petition of no less than a quarter of voters living in the relevant 
locality (Article 96). Referendums do not have to be held in order to amend the Constitution 
of Turkmenistan; it is the jurisdiction of the parliament to amend the Constitution (Article 
67), although in practice this prerogative has been exerted by the president. Indeed, the 
Constitution has been amended many times without a referendum: in 1995, 1997, 1998, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006. In practice, Turkmenistan is a highly centralized 
authoritarian state and all referendums have been called at the initiative of the Turkmen 
president, Saparmarat Niyazov, prior to his death in December 2006 and have achieved near 
unanimous backing according to official results. There is no documentation of any local 
referendums or of any citizens’ initiatives occurring in Turkmenistan. 
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Referendums 
 
The first referendum in Turkmenistan was held on the 26 October 1991 with two proposals: 
first to approve Turkmenistan’s independence from the USSR and second to express 
confidence in the policies of President (and former Communist Party First Secretary) 
Niyazov. According to official figures, more than 97% of voters participated in the 
referendum and around 94% approved both proposals. 
 
The second referendum was held on 15 January 1994 and proposed to extend President 
Niyazov’s term of office until 2002 without the need for a presidential election. The official 
results of the referendum were not plausible. Allegedly, the referendum was approved by 
99.99% on a turnout of 99.9%. In December 1999, the parliament amended the Constitution 
to allow Niyazov to be president for life. 
 
Ukraine 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives  
 
According to Article 72 of the Constitution of Ukraine, a national referendum can be called 
either by the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of Ukraine, or by the president of Ukraine, or by 
popular initiative at “the request of no less than three million citizens of Ukraine who have 
the right to vote, on the condition that the signatures in favour of designating the 
referendum have been collected in no less than two-thirds of the oblasts, with no less than 
100,000 signatures in each oblast.” Moreover, “[i]ssues of altering the territory of Ukraine 
are resolved exclusively by an All-Ukrainian referendum” (Article 73). Certain issues cannot 
be put to a referendum; namely issues relating to taxation, the budget and the granting of 
amnesties (Article 74). Three Chapters of the Constitution—Chapter 1 (General Principles), 
Chapter 3 (Elections, Referendum) and Chapter 13 (Introducing Amendments to the 
Constitution)—can only be amended on the initiative of either the president or by two-thirds 
of members of the Verkhovna Rada and the amendments must then be approved both by 
two-thirds of members of the Verkhovna Rada and by a national referendum (Article 156). 
Other chapters of the Constitution, including those that deal with the division of powers 
between the various branches of government can be amended with the approval of two-
thirds of members of parliament without need for a referendum (Article 155). 
 
In terms of local referendums, the Constitution contains provisions for the autonomous 
republic of Crimea to hold local referendums (Article 138). Moreover, territorial 
communities of villages, settlements and cities of Ukraine can, either directly or through 
bodies of local self-government, organize local referendums. According to Article 7 of the 
Law on Local Self-Government in Ukraine (1997), local referendums are “form[s] of resolving 
issues of local significance by a territorial community, directly through the will of the people” 
but cannot be used for issues relating to the competence of bodies of state power. Article 17 
of the same law provides for a referendum in order to decide whether or not to provide city 
councils with the right to manage property and financial resources owned by sub-municipal 
territorial communities. Finally, a local referendum can be used to revoke the powers of a 
village, settlement, city, or sub-municipal council if the council has violated the law, failed to 
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hold sessions as demanded by the law, or failed to resolve issues ascribed to its competence 
(Article 78). A local referendum can be used in similar circumstances to dismiss the village, 
settlement or city head (Article 79). 
 
The Law of Ukraine on All-Ukrainian and Local Referendums (1991 with subsequent 
amendments in 1992 and 2001) establishes the procedure for citizens’ initiatives in calling 
referendums. To launch a referendum, an initiative group must be formed at a meeting 
attended by no less than 200 citizens in the case of a national referendum or 50 citizens in 
the case of local64 referendum. The initiators must inform the local authorities at least ten 
days before the meeting takes place. The meeting will elect an initiative group of no less 
than 20 persons in the case of a national referendum, or ten persons, in the case of a local 
referendum (Article 16). The initiative must then be registered with the Central Commission 
for all-Ukrainian Referendums, in the case of a national referendum, and with the relevant 
council of people’s deputies in the case of a local referendum (Article 17). The initiative 
group then has to collect the required number of signatures within three months in the case 
of a national referendum, and within one month in the case of a local referendum (Article 
18). The precise number of signatures is not specified by the Law, although the Constitution 
sets a number of three million in the case of national referendums and Articles 78 and 79 of 
the Law on Local Self-Government stipulate that the initiative for a local referendum on the 
dismissal of a local council or the head of a village, settlement or city must come from at 
least one tenth of the voting population of the respective territory. 
 
Other forms of direct democracy are also defined by the Law on Local Self-Government. 
Article 8 envisages general assemblies of citizens to advise bodies of local self-government in 
resolving issues of local significance. Similarly, Article 9 provides for local initiatives whereby 
citizens can put certain important local issues up for discussion by local councils. Assemblies 
of citizens can also introduce local fees on the basis of voluntary self-taxation (Article 69). 
Finally, all territorial communities—i.e. towns, settlements and cities—must conduct a 
public hearing at least once a year in which citizens can raise issues and voice proposals with 
regard to matters of significance which belong to the competence of local self-government 
(Article 13). 
 
Referendums 
 
Since 1991 Ukraine has held three national referendums. The first of these took place on 17 
March 1991 simultaneously with the all-Union referendum called by the President of the 
USSR, Mikheil Gorbachev, on the preservation of the Soviet Union. In the all-Union 
referendum, voters were asked whether they wanted to live in a renewed Soviet Union. 
However, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet inserted a second question on the sovereignty of 
Ukraine: “Do you approve of Ukraine being part of the Union of sovereign States on the 
basis of the declaration of the sovereignty of Ukraine?” Support for the all-Union question 
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was 71% in Ukraine as a whole, but only 38.8% in Western Ukraine. The second question 
received the support of over 80% of voters. The turnout for the referendum was 83.5%. 65 
 
On 24 September 1991, the Ukrainian parliament approved Ukraine’s independence and 
agreed to put the proposal to a referendum. The referendum was held on 1 December 1991 
and 92.3% of valid votes were cast in favour of independence on an 84% turnout. 
 
On 15 January 2000, the president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, scheduled an all-Ukraine 
referendum for 16 April 2000. The principle aim of this initiative was to augment the 
president’s powers at the expense of those of the Verkhovna Rada. The impetus behind the 
referendum had supposedly come from a popular initiative signed by around four million 
Ukrainian citizens. However, the collection of signatures was allegedly organized by pro-
Kuchma loyalist Oleksandr Volkov, through his Social Protection Fund Network.66 The speed 
at which the signatures were collected seemed to stretch the limits of credulity and many 
signatures turned out to be forged: according to one report none of the 140 signatures 
received from Lviv City Council proved to be genuine and some names were blatantly 
faked.67 The decision to call a referendum and the indecent haste at which signatures were 
collected (or forged) must be understood in the context of the stand-off that was taking 
place in the Ukrainian parliament between supporters of the president and Kuchma’s 
opponents from leftist parliamentary factions. 
 
The proposals posed by this ‘popular initiative’ were: 1) to give the president the right to 
dissolve parliament if it fails to form a majority or to approve a state budget, (2) to limit the 
immunity of parliamentary deputies from criminal prosecution, (3) to reduce the number of 
parliamentary deputies from 450 to 300, (4) to establish a bicameral parliament, 5) to allow 
the Constitution to be amended by referendum alone (presumably without the required 
two-thirds majority of parliamentary deputies), and 6) to allow the president to dissolve 
Parliament if voters express no confidence in the body in a national referendum. 
 
On 29 March Ukraine’s Constitutional Court deemed proposals 5) and 6) to be 
unconstitutional. The rejection of point 5) reaffirmed the fact that the referendum would be 
consultative and would still require a two-thirds majority in parliament for any constitutional 
changes that may result from the referendum to be enacted. On 16 April, voters approved 
the other four measures with a majority of between 82% and 92% on an 81% turnout. 
However, significant violations occurred in the vote as the presidential apparatus put huge 
pressure on all executive branches of power to deliver a favourable outcome.68 In the end, 
the constitutional changes were not passed as the president was unable to muster the 
                                                          
65 Sarah Birch, “Electoral Behaviour in Western Ukraine in National Elections and Referendums, 1989-
91” , Europe-Asia Studies (November 1995). 
66 RFE/RL Newsline, 25 January 2000, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/01/250100.asp. 
67 Names collected in Lviv included Khuy Khuylo Khuyovych (Prick Pricko Prickovich), Pyzden Khuyyov 
Mikhuyovych (Cunty Prickov Myprickovich) and Bolt Khuylo (Shaft Pricko). See RFE/RL, Poland, Belarus 
and Ukraine Report (10 October 2000, Vol. 2, No. 37) at 
http://www.rferl.org/reports/pbureport/2000/10/37-101000.asp. 
68 Freedom House, Nations in Transit: Ukraine (2001), at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN008085.pdf. 
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required two-thirds majority in parliament. His position had been weakened by the 
publication in late 2000 of tapes documenting his giving orders to harass the opposition and 
suggesting the president’s involvement in the kidnapping and murder of independent 
journalist Heorhiy Gongadze. 
 
Subsequent amendments to Ukraine’s Constitution to reduce the role of the president 
somewhat were enacted by a two-thirds majority in the Verkhovna Rada in December 2004 
to resolve the political crisis that became known as the ‘Orange Revolution’. No referendum 
was held to obtain public approval for these changes. 
 
As well as the national referendums described above, referendums have also been held in 
Ukraine’s regions. On 20 January 1991, a referendum was held on the territory of Crimea, 
which gave the oblast of Crimea special status as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
within Ukraine. The referendum was passed with 93% of the vote.69  
 
In March 1994, a number of unofficial consultative referendums were held at oblast level to 
coincide with the Ukrainian parliamentary elections. In Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts 
(collectively known as the Donbas), the respective oblast councils held referendums on 
making Russian an official state language, allowing dual citizenship with Russia and forging 
closer ties with the CIS. More than 90% of voters supported these proposals. Simultaneously 
in Crimea, the president of the autonomous region called a referendum on greater 
autonomy of the peninsula within Ukraine, which was supported by 75% of voters.70 
 
In 2006, preparations were made to hold another referendum in Crimea to grant the Russian 
language the status of second official language within the territory of Crimea. It was called 
by the Supreme Council of Crimea on the initiative of supporters of Party of the Regions’ 
leader Viktor Yanukovich. However, on 22 March 2006, it was announced that the initiative 
had failed due to the failure of Crimean deputies to form special committees on holding the 
referendum.71 
 
Local referendums have also been held in a number of districts of Ukraine on local issues, 
although there is little documentation on them. The first documented example was one held 
in the summer of 1995 in the settlements of Nikopol, Marganets and Kamienets-Dneprovskiy 
on the initiative of the ecological organsation ‘Zeleny Svit’ (‘The Green World’) opposing the 
construction of a sixth reactor and further radioactive waste storage facilities at Zaporizhia 
nuclear power plant (ZAES). A majority of those voting rejected the construction, although 
the authorities chose to ignore the referendum.72 Similarly, in August 2005, residents of the 
villages of Zashkiv and Zavadiv voted overwhelmingly against a proposed highway that 
                                                          
69 http://www.geocities.com/ai320/crimea.htm. 
70 Robert S. Kravchuk and Victor Chudowsky, “Ukraine's 1994 elections as an economic event”, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 38, Issue 2 (June 2005), pp 131-165. 
71 Kyiv Weekly, 22 March 2006 at http://www.kyivweekly.com/?art=1142976276. 
72 See Sacred Earth Network, the Western Sector, at 
http://sen.igc.org/EurInfo/TheWesternSector.html and Informatsiinii Potal Kharkivskoi Pravozakhisnoi 
Grupi at http://khpg.org.ua/en/index.php?id=958889402. 
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would cut through the villages, overturning preliminary approval granted by the village 
council.73 Local referendums have also been used to rename villages.74 
 
Uzbekistan 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Basis for Referendums/Voter Initiatives  
 
According to Article 9 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan, “major matters of public and state 
life shall be submitted for a nation-wide discussion and put to … a referendum.” In order to 
amend the Constitution, the amendments need either to be passed by a two-thirds majority 
in both chambers of parliament or by a popular referendum (Article 127). Finally, rather 
unusually for a post-Soviet constitution, provision is made for a territory to secede from the 
state. According to Article 74, “[t]he Republic of Karakalpakstan shall have the right to 
secede from the Republic of Uzbekistan on the basis of a nation-wide referendum held by 
the people of Karakalpakstan.” In reality, however, this is rather like the de jure right of the 
union republics to secede from the USSR during the Soviet period; Uzbekistan is an 
authoritarian state and de facto it is inconceivable that a referendum would lead to 
Karakalpakstan’s exit from Uzbekistan at the present time. 
 
According to Article 105 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan and Article 7 of the Law on 
Community Self-Government, each settlement, kishlak (rural township or village), aul (village 
in Karakalpakstan) and mahhala (neighbourhood of a city, township or village) holds a 
citizens’ assembly that elects an assembly council (kengash) to implement decisions of the 
assembly and to exercise local self-government. The kengash consists of the chairman of the 
citizens’ assembly, various advisors, chairmen of assembly commissions and the executive 
secretary and sits for two-and-a-half years.   By 2001, 8,043 self-government bodies had 
been created in this way. 75 At mahhala level, local officials play a major role in community 
life, including in matters such as law enforcement.  
 
However, these assemblies have little to do with direct democracy. The mahhalla and the 
notion of “community government” embedded within it are part of a top-down nation-
building exercise in which the mahalla is seen as the cornerstone of Uzbek society and Uzbek 
nationhood. As Eric Sievers points out: 
 
While “Uzbek” was a vague term and no “Uzbekistan” existed prior to Soviet administrative 
and ethnolinguistic engineering, Uzbekistan leaders have foreclosed any reflexive revisitation 
of these terms. In deciding by fiat that the Uzbek nation is a distinct entity that has existed 
                                                          
73 National Ecological Centre of Ukraine (NECU) comments on the HLG report on TEN-T extension to 
the neighbouring countries at 
http://ec.europa.eu/ten/transport/external_dimension/hlg/2006_02_17_tent_consultation/doc/stak
eholders_contributions/environmental/08national_ecological_center_of_ukraine.pdf. 
74 See, for example, http://dpa.sta.gov.ua/english/page.php3?r=3&id=new73. 
75 Kuatbay Bektemirov and Eduard Rahimov, “Local Government in Uzbekistan” in Igor Munteanu and 
Viktor Popa, Developing New Rules in the Old Environment (LGI Books: 2001) at 
http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2001/84/Ch9-Uzbekistan.pdf. 
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for centuries or longer, the state has correspondingly recast mahhalla as the traditional, 
romantic basic structure of Uzbek society.76 
 
The citizens’ assemblies at mahhalla and higher levels are little more than an instrument of 
state power. According to the law the chairman of the citizens’ assembly is elected with the 
agreement of the khokim (head of the local administration) of the respective province or 
city, turning him into a servant of Uzbekistan’s authoritarian state. In reality, the kengash, 
especially at mahhalla level, is used as an instrument of the state to exert control over local 
communities and even to spy on community members in its struggle against alleged Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
 
There is no documentation for any legal precedent for local referendums in Uzbekistan, 
except in the case of Karakalpakstan (see above). 
 
Referendums 
 
All four referendums held in Uzbekistan since 1991 have registered both an official turnout 
figure and a “yes” vote at over 90%. Generally, they have been subject to overwhelming 
voter fraud and were not an expression of the democratic will of the people. 
 
The first referendum was the all-Union referendum on 17 March 1991 on the preservation 
of the Soviet Union (see above). In Uzbekistan, voters were asked to approve a proposal that 
a “sovereign and independent” Uzbekistan should remain in the USSR. The proposal was 
approved by a 95% “yes” vote on a 95% turnout. 
 
Uzbekistan declared independence on 31 August 1991 and the proposal to make the country 
an independent republic was put to voters by means of a referendum on 29 December 1991. 
98% of voters approved the motion on a 94% turnout. 
 
It was the results of the third referendum, held on 26 March 1995, that stretched the 
imagination most of all. The aim of the referendum was to prolong President Islam 
Karimov’s term of office until 2000, without the need for a presidential election. According 
to official results, both the “yes” vote and the turnout exceeded 99%. 
 
The fourth referendum was held on 27 January 2002 and its main purpose was once again to 
reaffirm President Karimov’s grip on power. Two proposals were put to the electorate: to 
create a bicameral parliament at the subsequent election and to extend the president's 
constitutional term of office from five to seven years. According to official results, 91.58% of 
the electorate turned out to vote, of whom 93.65% approved the creation of a bicameral 
parliament, and 91.78% approved the proposal to extend the presidential term to seven 
years.77 
 
                                                          
76 Eric W. Sievers, Uzbekistan's Mahalla: From Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community 
Associations, The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent: Volume 2, 2002. 
77 RFE/RLNewsline, 4 February 2002, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/02/040202.asp. 
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3. ANNEX 
 
National Referendums in the CIS (1991-2008) 
 
Country Date 
Referendum 
Type 
%Yes Accepted Issue Turnout 
Armenia 21 Sep. 1991 Binding 99.51 YES Independence 95.05 
Armenia 5 July 1995 Binding 70.31 YES Approval of Constitution 55.60 
Armenia 25 May 2003 Binding 50.33 NO Constitutional changes 51.97 
Armenia 27 Nov. 2005 Binding 94.51 YES Constitutional changes 65.34 
Azerbaijan 17 Mar. 1991 Binding n/a YES Sovereignty n/a 
Azerbaijan 29 Dec. 1991 Binding 99.76 YES Independence 95.27 
Azerbaijan 29 Aug. 1993 Binding 2.07 NO Confidence in President Elchibey 91.96 
Azerbaijan 12 Nov. 1995 Binding 93.27 YES Approval of Constitution 86.05 
Azerbaijan 24 Aug. 2002 Binding 97.49 YES Constitutional changes to harmonise with CoE 83.86 
Azerbaijan 24 Aug. 2002 Binding 97.38 YES Constitutional changes to harmonise with ECHR 83.86 
Azerbaijan 24 Aug. 2002 Binding 97.23 YES Various constitutional changes 83.86 
Azerbaijan 24 Aug. 2002 Binding 97.29 YES Constitutional changes on judicial reform 83.86 
Azerbaijan 24 Aug. 2002 Binding 97.19 YES Constitutional changes on organization of 
parliament and government 
83.86 
Azerbaijan 24 Aug. 2002 Binding 97.37 YES Constitutional changes on electoral procedure for 
presidential elections 
83.86 
Azerbaijan 24 Aug. 2002 Binding 97.26 YES Constitutional changes excluding certain issues 
from referendums 
83.86 
Azerbaijan 24 Aug. 2002 Binding 97.12 YES Constitutional changes on voting system for 
parliamentary elections 
83.86 
Belarus 14 May 1995 Binding 86.75 YES Equal status for Russian language 64.78 
Belarus 14 May 1995 Binding 78.56 YES New state flag and emblem 64.78 
Belarus 14 May 1995 Binding 86.97 YES Economic integration with Russian Federation 64.78 
Belarus 14 May 1995 Consultative 81.39 YES Allow pre-term dissolution of parliament 64.78 
Belarus 24 Nov. 1996 Binding 89.39 YES Move Independence Day to 3 July 84.14 
Belarus 24 Nov. 1996 Binding 88.24 YES 
Approve 1994 Constitution with president’s 
amendments 
84.14 
Belarus 24 Nov. 1996 Binding 15.62 NO Free and unrestricted purchase and sale of land 84.14 
Belarus 24 Nov. 1996 Binding 18.23 NO Abolition of the death penalty 84.14 
Belarus 24 Nov. 1996 Binding 10.02 NO 
Approve 1994 Constitution with Agrarian and 
Communist parties’ amendments 
84.14 
Belarus 24 Nov. 1996 Binding 28.69 NO Direct elections for local government heads 84.14 
Belarus 24 Nov. 1996 Binding 32.83 NO Open financing of all branches of power 84.14 
Belarus 17 Oct. 2004 Binding 88.91 YES 
Constitutional changes to remove term 
restrictions for presidential office 
90.28 
Georgia 31 Mar. 1991 Binding 99.49 YES Independence 90.57 
Georgia 2 Nov. 2003 Binding 89.62 YES Reduce number of MPs to 150 59.90 
Georgia 5 Jan. 2008 Consultative 77.00 YES NATO integration 56.19 
Georgia 5 Jan. 2008 Consultative 79.74 YES Spring parliamentary elections 56.19 
Kazakhstan 28 Apr. 1995 Binding 96.21 YES Extend President Nazarbayev’s term to 2000 91.21 
Kazakhstan 30 Aug. 1995 Binding 90.01 YES New constitution 90.58 
Kyrgyzstan 17 Mar. 1991 Binding 62.20 YES Sovereignty 81.70 
Kyrgyzstan 30 Jan. 1994 Consultative 97.03 YES Confidence in President Akaev 96.02 
Kyrgyzstan 22 Oct. 1994 Binding 88.11 YES Constitutional changes to introduce bicameral 
parliament 
86.00 
Kyrgyzstan 22 Oct. 1994 Binding 89.03 YES Allow further constitutional amendments by 
referendum 
86.04 
Kyrgyzstan 10 Feb. 1996 Binding 98.56 YES Constitutional changes to increase president’s 
power 
96.62 
Kyrgyzstan 17 Oct. 1998 Binding 95.38 YES Package of constitutional changes 96.44 
Kyrgyzstan 2 Feb. 2003 Consultative 91.75 YES Allow President Akaev to serve until 2005 86.68 
Kyrgyzstan 2 Feb. 2003 Binding 89.25 YES Establish a unicameral parliament elected from 
single-mandate constituencies 
86.68 
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Kyrgyzstan 21 Oct. 2007 Binding 95.44 YES Constitutional changes: parliamentary majority to 
propose prime minister 
81.58 
Kyrgyzstan 21 Oct. 2007 Binding 95.36 YES Amendments to Electoral Code 81.58 
Moldova 6 Mar. 1994 Consultative 97.9 YES 
Moldova as a independent and unitary state in 
existing borders 
75.1 
Moldova 23 May 1999 Consultative 64.20 YES Introduce a presidential form of government 58.33 
Russian Fed. 17 Mar. 1991 Binding 71.38 YES Creation of an elected president 75.09 
Russian Fed. 25 Apr. 1993 Binding 51.21 NO Early presidential elections 64.51 
Russian Fed. 25 Apr. 1993 Binding 69.06 NO Early parliamentary elections 64.51 
Russian Fed. 25 Apr. 1993 Binding 54.35 YES 
Approval of the social and economic programme 
of government and president 
64.51 
Russian Fed. 25 Apr. 1993 Binding 59.95 YES Confidence in President Yeltsin 64.51 
Russian Fed. 12 Dec. 1993 Binding 58.43 YES Approval of Constitution 54.81 
Tajikistan 6 Nov. 1994 Binding 90.00 YES Approval of Constitution 95.01 
Tajikistan 26 Sep. 1999 Binding 75.32 YES Various constitutional changes 92.54 
Tajikistan 22 June 2003 Binding 93.82 YES 
Constitutional changes including allowing the 
president to stand for two more 7-year terms 
96.3778 
Turkmenistan 26 Oct. 1991 Binding 94.10 YES Independence 97.39 
Turkmenistan 26 Oct. 1991 Consultative 93.50 YES Approval of President Niyazov’s policies 97.39 
Turkmenistan 15 Jan. 1994 Binding 99.99 YES Extend President Niyazov’s term to 2002 99.90 
Ukraine 17 Mar. 1991 Binding 83.50 YES Sovereignty 83.50 
Ukraine 1 Dec. 1991 Binding 92.26 YES Independence 84.18 
Ukraine 16 Apr. 2000 Consultative 85.92 YES Give the president the right to dissolve parliament 81.08 
Ukraine 16 Apr. 2000 Consultative 90.24 YES Limit the legal immunity of MPs 81.07 
Ukraine 16 Apr. 2000 Consultative 91.14 YES Reduce the number of MPs from 450 to 300 81.07 
Ukraine 16 Apr. 2000 Consultative 82.94 YES Establish a bicameral parliament 81.07 
Uzbekistan 17 Mar. 1991 Binding 94.90 YES Sovereignty 95.50 
Uzbekistan 29 Dec. 1991 Binding 98.26 YES Independence 94.14 
Uzbekistan 26 Mar. 1995 Binding 99.64 YES Extend President Karimov’s term to 2000 99.34 
Uzbekistan 27 Jan. 2002 Binding 93.65 YES Establish a bicameral parliament 91.58 
Uzbekistan 27 Jan. 2002 Binding 91.78 YES Extend the presidential term to from 5 to 7 years 91.58 
 
 
                                                          
78 Estimate given by Associated Press. 
